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8.1 Introduction
The subject of how unions aﬀect employment adjustment generates
strong opinions. The prevailing view among many economists and policy
analysts is that unions prevent labor market forces from operating eﬀec-
tively. Unions take a hard line in bargaining that prevents wages from fall-
ing, no matter how high unemployment has gotten. They resist attempts
by management to streamline production and introduce new technology.
They stand in the way of team-based production by clinging to outdated
job descriptions and occupational jurisdictions. They insist on advance
notice and severance pay arrangements that make it extremely costly to
reduce employment.
Au contraire, say union supporters. Centralized negotiations provide a
framework for wage adjustments to take place more rapidly than they
would in a world where all bargaining is one-on-one. Unions see the hand-
writing of technological change on the wall as clearly as management and
also see that management does not think about implementation of new
technology in the workplace until installation time. Joint committees pro-
vide a framework to make changes more productive by getting full input
from employees on how to redesign jobs and processes. Rules on job secu-
rity admittedly make downsizing more diﬃcult, but other parts of union
agreements make labor markets more eﬀective by encouraging long-term
employment relationships and investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills.
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In Latin America, the prevailing wisdom is that the former view is clos-
est to the truth. Even though most markets have been liberalized, the la-
bor market has been what Sebastian Edwards, the former chief economist
for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank, calls “the forgot-
ten sector” (1995, 277). Welfare losses come from three main sources: (1)
wages set above market clearing levels, (2) lost output and wages from
strikes, and (3) rent-seeking activities such as support for protectionism
and state ownership of industry. Edwards (1995, 286) argues
Reforming legislation governing labor-management relations in Latin
America is an important unﬁnished part of the recent structural re-
forms. In general, a modern and ﬂexible legislation is characterized by
incentives to resolve conﬂicts quickly and fairly. This requires clear rules
of the game, modern institutions, an eﬃcient judiciary, and a system in
which both parties incur costs if the conﬂict becomes protracted. In
most countries, however, the current situation is far from that: there are
asymmetric costs for unions and employers that, in fact, do not penalize
delaying agreements.
Given these very strong views, one would think that there would be a
massive research literature on how unions aﬀect employment adjustment
to changes in wages and output. Think again. Globally this subject has re-
ceived little attention, and in Latin America it has received virtually no at-
tention. In the case of Uruguay, some theoretical work has been developed
by Rama (1993a,b, 1994), while there is some recent empirical research
(Allen, Cassoni, and Labadie 1994, 1996; Cassoni, Labadie, and Allen
1995). Although there are numerous studies making union-nonunion com-
parisons for particular countries at particular time periods, they have gen-
erally concentrated on wage gains and wage gaps (Blanchﬂower 1984;
Freeman and Medoﬀ 1984; Hirsch and Addison 1986; Lewis 1986, 1990)
while employment diﬀerentials have been somehow neglected.1 Regarding
elasticities of substitution between labor and capital and among diﬀerent
types of labor, research has been even less proliﬁc. In the United States, it
has been found that they are much lower in union than nonunion estab-
lishments (Allen 1986; Freeman and Medoﬀ1982). Further, Boal and Pen-
cavel (1994) found some evidence suggesting the underlying production
function is diﬀerent, depending on the sector’s being unionized or not. In
the United Kingdom, Blanchﬂower, Millward, and Oswald (1991) ana-
lyzed the impact of unionism on the path of employment growth, ﬁnding
signiﬁcant diﬀerences, although their result has been criticized for not be-
ing robust (Machin and Wadhwani 1991).
Another line of research that has been followed is that related to the in-
ﬂuence of unions on the costs of adjusting the level of employment (Bur-
gess 1988, 1989; Burgess and Dolado 1989; Hamermesh 1993; and Lock-
wood and Manning 1989 are examples). Finally, it has been found that
1. An extensive survey can be found in Pencavel (1991) and Booth (1995).workers in the United States have lower quit rates (Freeman 1980), higher
layoﬀrates in the private sector (Medoﬀ1979), and lower layoﬀrates in the
public sector (Allen 1988), relative to nonunion workers.
Although all of the previous papers do illuminate one component or an-
other of the eﬀects of unions on wages and/or employment, they do not ad-
dress the bottom-line questions. For the same establishment or individual
with and without union status, does employment adjustment to changes in
wages and output vary when the ﬁrm is unionized and when it is not? How
long does it take to complete the adjustment in these two settings?
This chapter examines these issues directly, using evidence from manu-
facturing industries in Uruguay from 1975 through 1997. Uruguay is well
suited for such a study because the economy has gone through a series of
regime changes. A military government took over in 1973 and stayed in
power through 1984. During and after this regime, there were signiﬁcant
changes in labor and trade policy that will allow us to identify the impact
of these policies on labor demand parameters.
Collective bargaining was proscribed during the military regime, but la-
bor unions regained the right to bargain collectively with the return of
democracy in 1985. As part of its anti-inﬂation policy, the national gov-
ernment played a signiﬁcant role in negotiations. Since then, legal regula-
tions of work—which constitute public-order individual rights and there-
fore cannot be resigned under any circumstance—can be superseded by
collective agreements. They can go beyond these restrictions, increasing
(but not decreasing) the beneﬁts that workers have in the area of minimum
wages, working conditions, job security, and employee beneﬁts. Tripartite
negotiations took place at the industry level through “Wage Councils,” al-
lowing wage adjustment to vary by industry. If an agreement met the gov-
ernment’s anti-inﬂation targets, then it would apply to all ﬁrms in the in-
dustry—even those with nonunion work forces—once the agreement was
oﬃcially endorsed.
The government stopped participating in this system in 1991. Some bar-
gaining is still conducted through industry-wide Wage Councils, but in-
creasingly it is being done at the company level. As a result there are three
diﬀerent bargaining regimes that can be examined in this study: (1) before
1985, when bargaining was banned; (2) 1985–1991, when there was tripar-
tite bargaining; and (3) 1992 to the present, when the government did not
participate in bargaining.
Although the primary focus of this study is on the impact of these regime
changes, the role of changes in trade policy cannot be ignored. Taxes on
traditional exports were substantially cut in the mid-1970s, and some ini-
tial steps were taken toward lowering import barriers, steps that halted
during the global recession of 1982. After a temporary increase in 1985,
tariﬀs were gradually decreased starting in 1986. By the end of 1993, the
highest tariﬀ was 20 percent. At the same time, there were reductions in
nontariﬀ barriers, elimination of some sectoral privileges, and reductions
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creation of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1991.
By 1995 a great number of Uruguayan products could be exchanged with
MERCOSUR members (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) without any
tariﬀ. As a consequence, there was a sizable increase in the volume of both
exports and imports that, as will be shown in the following, had a signiﬁ-
cant impact on union behavior.
This study looks at two types of evidence. The primary focus is on esti-
mating labor demand parameters under diﬀerent bargaining regimes. Us-
ing standard techniques, the elasticity of employment to wages and output
is estimated and compared across policy regimes. The model is then ex-
tended to examine the dynamics of the adjustment process. A dynamic la-
bor demand model is estimated, letting the length of the lag vary with the
extent of openness and with the percentage of workers covered by collec-
tive bargaining. Additionally, the odds of layoﬀs and turnover resulting in
unemployment are examined to further understand the microprocesses by
which unions have an eﬀect on the adjustment process.
The chapter begins with background on the economy, the labor market,
and collective bargaining in Uruguay (section 8.2), followed by a brief the-
oretical overview on unions and labor demand (section 8.3) and a descrip-
tion of the data (section 8.4). The labor demand results (section 8.5) indicate
that a structural shift in the labor demand function occurred at about the
same time as the return of collective bargaining. Wages are weakly exoge-
nous to employment through 1984, but weak exogeneity is rejected after-
ward. The elasticity of employment to wages and output fell by more than
50 percent after 1984. There is no change in the amount of time needed for
the market to adjust, as indicated by the coeﬃcient of lagged employment.
Results from a bargaining model show that union wage demands are highly
sensitive to the openness of the economy. These patterns are further ana-
lyzed in the dynamic and in the mobility and unemployment results (section
8.6). The concluding section summarizes and assesses these ﬁndings.
8.2 Background on Uruguay
8.2.1 Macroeconomic and Labor Market Conditions
Traditionally, the Uruguayan economy has been subjected to a series of
global and regional shocks, particularly those coming from Argentina
(Favaro and Sapelli 1986), and this has continued during the last twenty-
ﬁve years. At the beginning of the sample period (1975), the Uruguayan
economy was still recovering from the oil shock of 1973 and the ensuing
global recession. These conditions were exacerbated by the European
Community’s decision in 1974 to stop importing beef. Unemployment was
above 10 percent in 1976–1978 (see ﬁgure 8.1).
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Fig. 8.1 Unemployment rate
Fig. 8.2 Openness
The economy recovered in the late 1970s in response to a series of steps
to liberalize ﬁnancial markets and promote exports. Growth accelerated
when the government adopted a preannounced schedule of monthly de-
valuations, with the rate of devaluation declining gradually over time.
Global economic conditions, however, were not kind to this schedule; by
the early 1980s, the net result was a highly overvalued currency that had
to be devalued in the global recession of 1982. Unemployment had fallen
to 7 percent by 1980–1981 but increased to 15 percent in 1983 and stayed
above 10 percent through 1986. The gross domestic product (GDP) de-
creased by 15.9 percent in three years.
By 1988 Uruguay had successfully recovered from this deep recession.
The economy grew 8.9 percent in 1986 and 7.9 percent in 1987, supported
by an increase in demand from Brazil, which was implementing a stabi-
lization plan (Plan Cruzado). Exports grew and the public deﬁcit de-
creased to 4.2 percent of GDP in 1987. In 1989, however, the favorable re-
gional environment changed, the public sector deﬁcit grew to 7 percent,
and a stabilization plan was implemented by the new government (elected
in 1990). These policies have resulted in a sustained, steady decline in in-
ﬂation from 129 percent in 1991 to 15 percent in 1997.
During the 1990s, together with the regional shocks, a domestic stabi-
lization plan and an increase in the openness of the economy had signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects on macro and industry performance (as shown in ﬁgure 8.2,where openness is deﬁned as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP).
The Argentinian “Plan de Convertibilidad,” imposed in April 1991, im-
proved relative competitiveness for Uruguay, with exports to that country
increasing 130 percent in 1991 and 74.3 percent in 1992. Expanded trade
with Argentina, no small part of which consisted of tourism, and a deteri-
oration of the real exchange rate meant that growth in the service sector far
outstripped growth in goods production. Within the latter, the actual im-
pact depended upon exposure to external competition.
Besides the domestic stabilization plan, during the period 1990–1992 a
series of trade policy measures consolidated the opening of the economy
that had started in the mid-1970s during the military regime, but that was
discontinued in the early 1980s. In 1982, the highest tariﬀ was 55 percent
and after a temporary increase in 1985, a gradual decrease started in 1986,
which ended with a maximum tariﬀof 40 percent in 1989. The pace of these
changes accelerated in 1991–1993. By 1993 the highest tariﬀ was 20 per-
cent. Together with these reductions, many nontariﬀ barriers and sectoral
privileges (like those given to the automotive industry) were removed, and
export subsidies were reduced (de Brun and Labadie 1997).
These unilateral trade policy changes were accompanied by a series of
regional tariﬀ reductions as a consequence of the creation of the MER-
COSUR. By 1995 a great number of Uruguayan products could circulate
among its members, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, without
any tariﬀ. The exceptions to the Common External Tariﬀ are subject to a
calendar that was established in December 1994. Economic conditions de-
teriorated after 1994, largely in response to high unemployment generated
by the “tequila eﬀect” in Argentina. Unemployment increased to 11 per-
cent in 1995 and 12 percent in 1996–1997. Unemployment held steady at
around 9 percent between 1987 and 1994.
The manufacturing sector has been severely aﬀected by all of these fac-
tors. Its share in total output has gone down from 25–27 percent at the be-
ginning of the period to 18 percent in 1997. Employment in manufacturing
grew until 1989, but it has decreased signiﬁcantly since then, to unprece-
dented levels. This decrease reﬂects the impact of trade liberalization as
some establishments cut back production, whereas others raised produc-
tivity to compete.
8.2.2 Collective Bargaining
When Parliament was closed by the military in June 1973, the union con-
federation Convención National de Trabajadores (CNT) launched a gen-
eral strike. The government reacted by banning union activity and giving
employers the right to dismiss anyone who did not return to work. Many
union leaders were jailed; the others went into hiding or exile. The union
movement began a political comeback in the early 1980s, with a series of
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there was no bargaining until the return of democracy in 1985.2
In the absence of unions, employers were relatively free to adjust wages
and employment. Wage increases were limited to lagged inﬂation. This pol-
icy, along with high unemployment, was accompanied by a 49 percent de-
crease in real wages from 1973 through 1984. Employment adjustment also
became more ﬂexible. Interview evidence compiled by Handelman (1981)
indicates that after the ban on unions, many employers used the opportu-
nity to get rid of trade union oﬃcials and excess employees. Dismissals of
public-sector workers also were permitted by law between 1977 and 1984
(Gillespie 1991). On the supply side, there was a surge in emigration pre-
cipitated by political repression and high unemployment. Taking into ac-
count all of these factors, it is clear that the Uruguayan labor market was
exposed to strong competitive forces during the ban on unions.
Starting in 1985, Uruguay’s unique system of Wage Councils was rein-
stituted. Collective bargaining in the private sector in Uruguay had tradi-
tionally operated mainly through a system of trilateral Wage Councils that
set minimum wages by industry and labor category. Wage levels were ad-
justed three times per year through 1990; since then, accumulated inﬂation
since the last adjustment had to pass a speciﬁc threshold for wages to be
adjusted. Often, the Wage Councils agreed to a formula that would be in
eﬀect for sixteen to twenty-four months, allowing adjustment to take place
without a formal meeting. If the government delegates gave their consent
to the wage agreement, it applied to the entire sector, not just to the ﬁrms
and unions involved in the bargaining. Government approval usually re-
quired keeping wage increases in line with oﬃcial inﬂation targets. Direct
negotiation between the union and the ﬁrm was also practiced, especially
in manufacturing. In 1991 there was a signiﬁcant change in the structure of
negotiations. The government stopped participating in bargaining, and the
terms of the contract became binding only on those ﬁrms and unions that
were actually represented in the negotiation. Currently, Wage Councils
meet in only a few sectors and the result, to be shown in the following, has
been a sharp drop in union density in the private sector.
Much bargaining now takes place at the company level. Membership is
not compulsory and union dues are voluntary in most cases. In 1988, only
three years after unions were legal again, the single National Central
Union reported a total of 188,000 members and ﬁve years later, in 1993,
177,000 members, belonging to seventeen federations and 359 unions. In
1996, there were 164,000 members in the National Central Union, but
some unions are not members of it. By 1993, 54 percent of the membership
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2. For a general description of labor market institutions in Uruguay, see Cassoni, Labadie,
and Allen (1995).belonged to the public sector, which has had the smallest drop in its num-
ber of aﬃliates.
The role that collective agreements play in introducing rigidities could be
very signiﬁcant, varying in degree depending on union density and the spe-
ciﬁc clauses of the contracts, which include wage adjustments, minimum
wages by job categories, length of work day, holidays, job rotation and sta-
bility, recognition of union oﬃcers, “peace clauses” that preclude strikes
under certain circumstances, and other work-related conditions. Although
there are no explicit clauses regarding severance pay or restrictions to hir-
ing new workers, unions have generally imposed extra costs to employment
adjustment. In some sectors, additional compensation beyond that dic-
tated by the labor contract has been a common practice, while in others
strikes have worked as a means of getting additional severance pay. Gov-
ernment intervention in collective bargaining is only provided in the case of
Wage Councils, and there is no other regulation of the bargaining process,
not even in the case of conﬂict and strikes (for a more detailed description,
see Cassoni, Labadie, and Allen 1995, 167–70). No database up to this date
has actually evaluated the impact of the contents of collective agreements.
Recently, Cedrola, Raso, and Perez Tabó (1998) have examined qualita-
tively the contents of collective agreements for the period 1985–1995. For
this study, a database that covers all collective agreements registered at the
Ministry of Labor between 1985 and 1997 has been developed, and the con-
tents of its clauses have been quantiﬁed to determine the actual nonwage
costs resulting from the bargaining process at the industry level.
Using these data it is possible to analyze quantitatively a period in which
union behavior was absent (through 1984); a period in which we know the
union density of the sector as well as the amount of nonwage costs imposed
on all ﬁrms in an industry, a consequence of a bargaining structure in place
from 1985 through 1991; and a more recent period in which we know union
density, but the collective agreements are exclusively binding for those
ﬁrms and those workers that participated in the negotiation and signed the
agreement. The completeness of data for this ﬁnal period is less clear, be-
cause many of these agreements did not have to be registered at the Min-
istry of Labor (precisely because they did not have to be endorsed by the
public authority in order to be binding among the contracting parties).
This study focuses on manufacturing, where there are pronounced
changes in union density during the last decade, with no small amount of
variation across individual industries. Upon the return of unions in 1985,
60 percent of production workers were covered by collective-bargaining
agreements (see ﬁgure 8.3).
This initial level probably reﬂects political support for the role unions
played in the return to democracy. Union sustainability hinges on both
worker support for collective, as opposed to individual, agreements, and
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sity gradually dropped to 40 percent by 1988 and stayed near that level
through 1992. By this point the contracts signed under the old Wage Coun-
cil system had expired, and the impact of trade liberalization was begin-
ning to be felt. The openness ratio jumped from 44 percent in 1992 to 55
percent in 1993 and was above 60 percent for most of 1994–1997. Union
density dropped from 42 percent in 1992 to 22 percent in 1993 and has
stayed at about that level since. The pattern of union growth and decline
has varied considerably across industries, as shown in table 8.1.
Union strength remained near 100 percent throughout the sample pe-
riod in the chemical and oil industries, which not coincidentally consist
largely of state-owned enterprises. In fact, union density dropped in all in-
dustries after 1992, except in chemicals and oil products. The most dra-
matic decline took place in metal products and nonmetallic industries,
where union coverage in the period dropped to 20 percent of its original
level. At the same time, and particularly in metal products, imports plus ex-
ports increased sharply. There also was a considerable drop in union cov-
erage in textiles and apparel and, to a lesser extent, in the paper industry.
With the exception of food products, all industries experienced an increase
in openness after 1992.
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Fig. 8.3 Percentage union
Table 8.1 Percentage Union and Openness Ratio, by Year and Industry
Union Open
Industry 1985 1988 1992 1997 1985 1992 1997
Food products 59 54 55 27 24 24 28
Textiles and apparel 77 54 46 16 49 54 83
Paper products 70 52 44 39 19 19 45
Chemicals 100 87 100 94 16 44 60
Nonmetallic 48 21 11 10 12 22 36
Metal products 100 43 43 19 76 146 3508.3 Theoretical Framework
This section describes the framework used to analyze possible changes
in both elasticities of labor demand and labor dynamics, due to the insti-
tutional changes that took place in 1985, that is, the reappearance of trade
unions as “players” in the labor market. In order to do so, the estimable
models will be speciﬁed so as to measure labor demand elasticities for pro-
duction workers and the speed of adjustment of labor to its equilibrium
level in both regimes.
Through 1984, a competitive model seems suitable to describe the be-
havior of the labor market. Wage increases were set by the government
from 1968 up to 1979, although from 1977 onward there were extra shifts
in some sectors. The government concerns in this process were focused on
stopping the huge increase in inﬂation rates so that it decided to “freeze”
all prices and wages in the economy, not taking into account labor demand
conditions. Hence, they were exogenous to the ﬁrm. Since 1985, it might be
possible to approximate the observed employment and wage pairs using
the same model, but the institutional framework actually changed. Since
that date, the wage level has been the result of a bargaining process that
has, itself, evolved all along the decade. Before 1992, bargaining was a syn-
chronized process, taking place at the industrial-sector level through Wage
Councils. After that date, it became more heterogeneous as negotiations
at the ﬁrm level have become quite common, while synchronization has
deteriorated.
Given the previously mentioned institutional changes, the following re-
search strategy was developed: First, a model of labor demand derived
from a pure neoclassical static framework was estimated. The wage vari-
able is a cost of labor proxy, including wage plus nonwage costs—such as
health insurance and payroll taxes—as well as other beneﬁts bargained be-
tween ﬁrms and unions from 1985 onward.
As will be shown in more detail in the following, the model was estimated
for the whole period and the stability of the parameters was tested. The
econometric analysis supported the speciﬁcation of a diﬀerent model for
the post-1984 period. This model was derived from a bargaining frame-
work. A ﬁrst implication is that wages are not exogenous as in the previous
speciﬁcation, as they are determined jointly by unions and ﬁrms through a
bargaining process, where ﬁrms attempt to maximize proﬁts and unions
maximize their members’ utility function. Second, other variables could
enter the model as alternative wages or fallback positions of the parties.
8.3.1 Labor Demand: Theoretical Framework
We begin with a standard speciﬁcation for a labor demand equation in a
static framework. Assuming a generalized constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) production function with three inputs (capital and labor di-
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would yield a three-equations system of derived demands for each input.
The equation describing the demand for production workers would be




   2 ln Qt,
where N   employment of production workers, w   wage, p   product
price, and Q   output.
Hence, the elasticity of substitution between capital and employment
( ) is equal to – 1, while the wage elasticity of labor demand is – 1   (1 –
sL), with sL denoting labor share in value added.
In order to estimate the model, some methodological issues have to be re-
solved. If variables are not stationary, a possible strategy is to estimate the
model in diﬀerences. A second approach would be to test if the variables
involved are cointegrated and, if so, if the estimation can be carried out in
levels. Because the estimators in equation (1) are biased in ﬁnite samples,
it might be preferable to estimate a dynamic version of the model based on
Engle and Granger’s representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987):
(2)  (L)(1   L)Zt        Zt 1 d(L)εt,
where  (L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator; Z denotes the vec-
tor of variables involved (N, w/p, Q); d(L) is a polynomial; and εt is a sta-
tionary process.
The model can be linearly transformed as an autoregressive-distributed
lag model:
(3)  1(L)yt    2(L)Xt   εt,
where  1(L)   1 – Σm
i 1  1iLi;  2(L)   Σm
i 0  2iLi and (y,X)   Z.
The econometric analysis of the model will determine its ﬁnal dynamic
structure. It has been shown that the lag structure of each variable need not
be the same (for an extensive discussion of all the above methodological is-
sues, see Banerjee et al. 1993).
The fact that variables are nonstationary means that at least some
shocks have permanent eﬀects on them. In particular, shocks related to
productivity and accumulated knowledge have been generally found to be
nontransitory so that they have long-lasting eﬀects on output and employ-
ment (Aghion and Saint-Paul 1993; Blanchard and Quah 1989; and refer-
ences therein). Thus, variables would have a stochastic trend, but, if co-
integrated, the equilibrium relationship among them would still be
stationary and hence stable. The dynamics are the result of agents not be-
ing able to adjust instantaneously to equilibrium because of factors such as
adjustment costs, price rigidities, and so on. Adjustment costs have been
extensively discussed in the literature (Hamermesh 1993, 1995; Hamer-
mesh and Pfann 1996) as the source of the observed lags in adjusting em-
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equilibrium level (Ne). If ﬁrms maximize expected proﬁts, expectations are
static and costs are quadratic, the optimum path of employment would be
(4) Nt   g(Ne   Nt),
yielding a demand for labor equation like
(5) Nt   Nt 1    Xt,
with Xtbeing a vector of variables determining long run labor demand and
  a parameter measuring the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, which is
thus assumed to be constant.
8.3.2 Bargaining Models
Since 1985 unions started playing a role in the determination of wages,
working conditions, and employment. Their role has varied over time, as
well as the issues they bargained over. After analyzing all the collective
agreements that have been signed since then, it is clear that there have al-
ways been negotiations over wages but rarely over employment. Agree-
ments have covered a wide range of other beneﬁts, increasing the annual
wage a worker receives; linking the wage to diﬀerent variables, such as pro-
ductivity or tenure; and increasing fringe beneﬁts. Working conditions
have also been in the bargaining agenda, as well as the length of the work-
ing week and year. Although at ﬁrst glance negotiations looked as if done
in stages, this turned out to be false. The procedure followed has generally
been one by which at some point unions and ﬁrms have bargained over the
wage, other beneﬁts, and working conditions. Regarding every issue but
the wage, agreements have worked as long-term contracts (one year mini-
mum, three years on average). Regarding the wage, however, they were
quite short, covering a time period of three or four months, so that most of
the contracts were agreements only over the wage.
The foregoing suggests that the most suitable benchmark to analyze the
Uruguayan bargaining process is that of a right-to-manage model (for a
discussion on this topic, see Pencavel 1991). The model will be considered
as a maintained hypothesis, based on the analysis of all collective agree-
ments. No tests against an eﬃcient contract model will be carried out as it
has been extensively proven by now that those tests cannot support one
speciﬁcation against the other (Booth 1995; Pencavel 1991).3Thus, the fol-
lowing speciﬁcation is used:
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3. For example, the alternative income would enter the employment equation only in the
eﬃcient contract model. However, some utility functions can yield a solution to the eﬃcient
bargain that excludes the alternative income from the speciﬁcation. Further, the empirical
distinction between both models is not straightforward, as the contract curve may lie on the
labor demand curve (Carruth and Oswald 1987). Given the model proposed, we are explicitly
assuming that unions have no direct impact on employment. However, we did perform the ex-
ercise of adding union variables to the employment equation, and the estimation results sup-
ported the model speciﬁed. The output of these regressions is available upon request.First Stage: Unions and Firms Bargain over the Cost of Labor
 (w, wa, N) is the union’s utility function, where w is the real wage, wa is
the alternative income, and N is employment. It is assumed that member-
ship status is lost if unemployed; that all members of the union are equally
considered by union leaders; and that members care about the real wage
surplus over the alternative income they would earn working elsewhere or
being unemployed (de Menil 1971). A standard speciﬁcation is then
 (w, wa, N, M)   (w   wa)N ,
where   is a parameter denoting how much weight the union gives to em-
ployment in its utility function. If   equals 1, then the model is the rent-
maximization model (Pencavel 1991).
Π( p, Q, K, N, pc, w) is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function, where K   capital and
pc price of K. It is assumed that managers maximize revenue minus costs,
so that
 (p, Q, K, N, pc, w)   pQ   wN   pcK.
A well known solution to the bargaining problem is given by the maxi-
mization over the wage of the generalized Nash bargain, subject to the op-
timum labor demand that will be set in a second stage:
(6) Max
w
Y   (    0) (Π   Π0)1  
s.t.
N   N∗
 0 and Π0 are the fallback positions of each player. They refer to what
the union and the ﬁrm would get in the event of no agreement (Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinski 1986). If we assume that under this circumstance
there will be a strike, then the ﬁrm will have zero operating proﬁts, and
union members will have zero earnings.4
Second Stage: Firms Maximize Proﬁts
(7) Max
N,K
Π   pQ   wN   pcK
Subject to quite restrictive assumptions, the solution for (6) and (7) is
(8) N∗   N(w/p; Q)
w∗    wa.
The ﬁrst equation is just the result of proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms, un-
der a CES production function, for example. However, to get the equation
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4. There are no legal provisions assuring any income to strikers in Uruguay. They generally
ask people for contributions, but this cannot be measured.for the wage level, it has to be assumed that, when bargaining, ﬁrms take
capital as given; that is, they have already made decisions on the capital
level. Thus, the proﬁt function depends solely on employment. The param-
eter  is a markup over the alternative income. This parameter is a function
of sector characteristics, such as the degree of competitiveness and the
aﬃliation rate (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991).
Finally, the alternative-income workers consider as a comparison wage
is a weighted average of what they would earn if they got a job in any man-
ufacturing industry, what they would get if they decided to become self-
employed, and what they would receive as unemployment beneﬁts in the
event of losing their jobs. Weights are given by the probability of being in
each of the mentioned states, calculated as the annual frequency of each
category.
The estimable model proposed is a multivariate model, in which wages
are not exogenous but set subject to the determination of the level of em-
ployment. Unionism is treated as an exogenous variable because the major
changes in this variable during our sample period were driven by social and
political processes.
8.3.3 Union Impact
In a static framework, unions have an incentive to take whatever steps
they can to reduce the wage elasticity of labor demand so that they can bar-
gain for increased wages with less severe consequences for employment.
Unions can make product demand less elastic by making fewer options
available to consumers through various rent-seeking activities. One way of
doing this is to create entry barriers, such as state ownership or regulated
entry into markets where establishments are unionized. Tariﬀs, quotas,
and other barriers to free trade also can be used to reduce consumer choice.
The elasticity of substitution between union labor and other inputs can
be reduced through collective bargaining. Contracts with unions often
spell out the conditions under which work is to be performed, including
dictates on minimum crew sizes, limitations on substituting nonunion per-
sonnel for work that “belongs” to the union, and limits on technologies
that reduce labor hours.
Empirically, it is well known (at least since Marshall) that unions should
try to organize the sectors of the economy with the most inelastic demand.
In this study we look at the same sectors of manufacturing before and af-
ter reunionization, so this allows us to control for this self-selection into
rent-seeking opportunities. Instead, this study will be able to establish in a
before-and-after framework whether unions are actually able to reduce la-
bor demand elasticities.
The impact of unions on adjustment lags and the elasticity of labor de-
mand to output hinge on a variety of factors. Ignoring adjustment costs for
the moment, keep in mind that ﬁrms can adjust labor hours to a change in
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pact of unions on this tradeoﬀ is not clear ex ante. Unions often negotiate
for premium rates for overtime that are well above those required by labor
legislation, which would by itself lead unionized ﬁrms to increase employ-
ment more for a given increase in output. However, unions also negotiate
for employee beneﬁts that make increasing employment expensive relative
to increasing hours. Lower turnover in unionized establishments encour-
ages greater investments in employee training, which in turn increase the
cost of hiring an additional person. In a frictionless world, the eﬀect of
unions on the employment-hours balance would be an empirical question
that would hinge on whether the marginal cost of an extra hour per person
is the overtime rate dictated by labor laws or the superovertime rates from
the union contract. If it is the standard overtime rate, then the dominating
eﬀect of unions would be through increased costs of hiring an extra person,
and we would expect a smaller elasticity of employment to output.
A ﬁnal channel for union inﬂuence is the speed at which labor adjust-
ments are made. Unions have numerous methods at their disposal to
change the cost of making changes in employment. This can be done with
formal contract provisions dictating advance notice or severance pay in
case of layoﬀs or through informal threats of slowdowns or strikes. An-
other factor leading to slower adjustment of employment to output in
unionized establishments is the low rate of voluntary turnover. When at-
trition is suﬃciently high, employment can adjust very quickly through a
simple hiring freeze.
The expected duration of layoﬀs often plays an important role. If the ex-
pected duration of a drop in output is expected to be short, unions will not
hesitate to opt for layoﬀs rather than hours reductions so that workers can
take full advantage of unemployment insurance. The prevailing wisdom is
that unions create longer adjustment lags through their impact on advance
notice and severance pay.
8.4 Data
Before describing the actual deﬁnition of variables, some aggregation is-
sues are worth stating. First, the units of observation considered will be
manufacturing industries at the two-digit level of aggregation. Six of them
can be observed during the period 1975 to 1997: food, beverage and to-
bacco; textiles and apparel; paper; chemicals and oil products; nonmetal-
lic minerals; and metal products. It is well known that the optimum unit of
observation is the establishment, as adding up technologies never guaran-
tees that the parameters obtained for the aggregate are what they are
sought to be. However, working with industries is not the worst of the al-
ternatives. In a small country like Uruguay, most of the year-to-year vari-
ation in industry data is driven by a small number of ﬁrms; hence, problems
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theless, it should be taken into account that this might bias the estimates
(Hamermesh 1993). Second, temporal aggregation does not seem a prob-
lem here as quarterly data will be used so that the lag structure should not
understate the true lag structure.
8.4.1 Cost of Labor: W
The measure to be used in the model has to approximate the total cost of
labor for the ﬁrm so that it has to include not only the wage but also non-
wage costs. The latter include labor taxes; social security contributions;
and bargained costs since 1985. We are omitting, however, all costs related
to hiring and ﬁring workers. In order to account for these costs, the labor
demand function should be speciﬁed, contingent on diﬀerent states of na-
ture that would imply ﬁring or hiring workers, and a distribution of these
states should be also proposed. It can be shown that not specifying a state-
contingent labor demand might bias the estimates of the elasticities down-
ward due to the omission of relevant variables. We will not address this is-
sue empirically as data needed to calculate marginal ﬁring and hiring costs
are not available.5
Data on wages are obtained from the Quarterly and Annual Industrial
Surveys carried out by the National Institute of Statistics (INE).6 Annual
data for production workers are available from 1975 up to 1997. Quarterly
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5. The law relative to severance pay has not changed in the sample period, and the com-
pensation a worker is entitled to is the same for all industries and depends on his/her tenure
(none if tenure is less than three months; one wage per year for those working for more than
three months, up to a maximum of six). Average tenure for those employed in 1991–1997 (the
only years for which the data is available) is between seven and ten years, not varying much
between industries. Hence, the expected average severance pay does not change, being be-
tween 3.7 and 4.2 wages, depending on the industry. As it is not possible (due to the number
of observations) to calculate the probability of a worker being laid oﬀ for each tenure, this
should be calculated as the overall frequency of layoﬀs and will thus be negatively correlated
with employment by deﬁnition. Finally, even if we included a tentative measure of average
severance pay based on tenure of employees instead of on that of laid oﬀ workers, we would
be introducing biases which need not be of the same sign along the period. They would de-
pend on the prevailing rules of ﬁring workers, and these have been probably diﬀerent during
1975–1997. The only evidence available was especially collected for the last quarter of 1997.
Manufacturing workers who were laid oﬀ in the month prior to the survey had an average
tenure of 1.5 years, while the average for all unemployed manufacturing workers was six years.
This suggests that a rule of last in–ﬁrst out was in place. However, during periods of restruc-
turing, as were the late 1970s and the early 1990s, ﬁrms might have gotten rid of more senior
workers, that is, workers with higher wages and who were not easily retrainable. Given all
these issues, we will omit these costs from the analysis, although they might be reﬂected in the
estimated eﬀect of unions on the labor demand model.
6. These surveys are carried out using a sample of ﬁrms employing ﬁve workers and more
that stems from the previous industrial census. Data collected refer to many variables related
to production, employment, and inputs. The Quarterly Industrial Survey reports indexes
while the Annual Industrial Survey publications report values. The Wage Survey is carried
out on a monthly basis at establishments belonging to all economic sectors.data, however, are not published (nor processed by the INE) after 1991.
Hence, for 1992–1997, the within-year evolution of wages was assumed to
follow the same pattern as that stemming from the Wage Survey (INE) for
manufacturing workers.7
Data on nonwage costs were taken from Picardo, Daude, and Ferre
(1997) and from Cassoni and Ferre (1997). All costs related to health in-
surance and social security as well as payroll taxes were used to build a fac-
tor by which to increase wages for each two-digit industrial sector. Social
security and health insurance contributions are a ﬁxed percentage of wages
that has varied over time. On the other side, payroll taxes, ﬁrst imposed in
1982, have generally varied, depending on the level of earnings. Hence, in-
formation from the Household Survey (INE) was used to calculate the dis-
tribution of workers in the diﬀerent relevant segments, yearly, for each
manufacturing sector. Apart from these factors increasing wages, employ-
ers face an annual extra payment of one monthly salary plus twenty days
that must be paid before the worker starts his/her annual holidays before
the end of the year. Both were also included in the cost of labor. There are
several issues over which unions have bargained since 1985. Among them,
supplemental end-of-year bonuses, either related to tenure, productivity,
or simply on a general basis; shorter length of the working day; and extra
holidays. These negotiations took place at the industrial two-digit level so
that they vary by industry. Annual premia applying to all workers was di-
rectly used to increase the factor built upon the legal rates. Information on
extra holidays was used to calculate the percentage increase in costs due to
nonworking days. If paid vacations were twelve days more per year over
the legal standard, the actual monthly wage would be 25/24 times w, in-
stead of w. Where agreements were reached shortening the legal length of
the working day or week, the cost of labor was increased by the proportion
of legal to bargained hours in the same way as paid vacations.
All the information described above, stemming from the manufacturing
collective agreements signed between 1985 and 1997, was used to build
an index increasing the legal cost of labor. This index varied in time and
among industries, with an average value for the whole manufacturing sec-
tor of 12 percent. Industries with the lowest extraordinary bargaining costs
were paper; metallic industries; and nonmetallic minerals, for which the in-
crease was around 1 percent on average. Sectors related to food, beverage
and tobacco, and chemicals have negotiated increases of 12 percent over
the legal costs, while those related to textiles have an average percentage
premia of 21 percent during the period. Given all the foregoing, the cost of
labor variable was deﬁned as
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7. The Wage Survey is carried out on a monthly basis at establishments belonging to all
economic sectors.Cost of Labor   CL   Wage∗(1   legal nonwage costs 
  bargained nonwage costs).
8.4.2 Variable Deﬁnitions
Employment (N) refers to total number of production workers obtained
from the Quarterly and Annual Industrial Surveys at the two-digit level.
An index of production (Q) is available on a quarterly basis (INE). The in-
dex was then transformed to monetary values using the 1988 Industrial
Census and the Annual Industrial Survey (INE). Data on product prices
(p) refer to the producer price index (PPI) at the two-digit level (INE). All
data refer to monthly values calculated as an average on a quarterly basis.
8.4.3 Some Corrections to the Oﬃcial Data
In Uruguay, the industrial census is performed every 10 years. Each
time a census is done, annual and quarterly surveys update their samples
based on the new information. These samples are such that those estab-
lishments with more than 50 or 100 workers (depending on their share on
the industry value added) are always surveyed (hence, death and births are
accounted for), while smaller plants are sampled at the beginning of the
period and remain in the sample until the new industrial census is carried
out. In 1988, the last national industrial census was performed and its re-
sults showed that the samples that were being used in the industrial sur-
veys—stemming from the 1978 census—were severely misrepresenting
the diﬀerent sectors. Annual surveys started including the new informa-
tion in 1989, while quarterly surveys did so in 1993. However, no correc-
tion to the data was done before those dates. The diﬀerences in the
samples meant that the estimated levels of employment and output for the
whole manufacturing sector diﬀered by about 25 percent depending on
the sample used. At the two-digit level there were even broader diﬀer-
ences. It was thus decided to correct the oﬃcial data, discussing and tak-
ing advice from those in charge of the surveys at the INE. Given that the
1982–1983 economic recession had major and diﬀerent eﬀects, depending
on the industrial sector, the assumption used to calculate the new data was
that the lack of representativeness of the 1978 sample went back to 1984.
As other sources showed that the evolution of the variables stemming
from the surveys along the post-1984 period was quite correct, the diﬀer-
ences in the levels according to both samples were geometrically distrib-
uted along those years (1984–1988 for the annual survey; 1984–1993 for
the quarterly survey).
8.4.4 Degree of Openness: OPEN
The index was calculated as total exports plus total imports divided by
value added, per manufacturing industry. Data came from the Republic
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the data.
8.4.5 Alternative Wages: AW
Alternative wages were calculated using the information of wages in
manufacturing as described in 8.4.1 and that of average income of self-
employed individuals according to the Household Survey. The alternative
income for a worker in industry jwas deﬁned as the weighted average of the
wage in the rest of the manufacturing industries; the income the worker
would receive if he/she becomes unemployed and collects unemployment
beneﬁts (50 percent of his/her current wage); and the average income of
self-employed individuals. Weights were deﬁned as the annual frequency of
each category as stemming from the Household Survey.
8.4.6 Union Density: UNION
Union density was calculated using annual number of production work-
ers as stemming from the Industrial Surveys and total membership re-
ported by the National Union Federation after each congress. Congresses
took place in 1985, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996–1997. In intervening years,
union membership is estimated through simple interpolation.
Descriptive statistics for the above variables are summarized in table 8.2,
diﬀerentiating between the pre- and postreunionization subperiods (1975–
1984 and 1985–1997). Data for the entire manufacturing sector are re-
ported to indicate overall trends; data for manufacturing industries indi-
cate the diversity of conditions across diﬀerent markets. Note that with the
return of collective bargaining, the market trends are toward greater pro-
duction, reduced employment, higher wages, and increased openness.
To  preview the dynamic patterns of the key variables, the quarterly
change in employment for the manufacturing sector is plotted along with
the quarterly changes in production and employment (all in logs) in ﬁgures
8.4 and 8.5. Employment varied less on a quarterly basis with the return of
unionization; the standard deviation of the log change in employment fell
from 0.036 in 1975–1984 to 0.028 in 1985–1997. At the same time produc-
tion became more variable, with the standard deviation of log change ris-
ing from 0.063 to 0.095 for the same two periods. This would indicate a
strong likelihood that employment-output elasticity fell after 1985. The
story for wages is less clear-cut. The standard deviation of the log change
in wages decreased from 0.124 to 0.063.8 Proportionally speaking, the
quarterly variation in wages fell by more than the quarterly variation in em-
ployment, indicating a possible increase in the wage elasticity of labor de-
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8. The null hypothesis of no change in the variance is rejected at the 5 percent level for all
three variables and at the 1 percent level for wages and output, with F(38,51)   3.85 for log
wages, F(38,51)   2.27 for log output and F(38,51)   1.65 for log employment.Table 8.2 Descriptive Statistics
1975.1–1984.4 (Obs.   40) 1985.1–1997.4 (Obs.   52)
Variable Mean SD Max. Min. Mean SD Max. Min.
Manufacturing Sector
W 82.02 13.97 103.6 56.81 90.02 21.64 133.3 52.38
LNWC 1.336 0.071 1.426 1.243 1.332 0.031 1.375 1.290
BNWC 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.123 0.038 1.156 1.000
TLC 109.7 18.6 143.54 72.56 136.2 36.34 203.7 67.79
AW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 42.95 11.67 62.59 24.87
UNION 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.129 0.601 0.200
OPEN 0.298 0.036 0.388 0.242 0.468 0.109 0.620 0.295
Q 57.00 6.740 70.00 44.60 60.16 5.097 71.04 49.16
N 108,143 14,496 129,491 86,010 104,782 19,727 129,995 71,735
1975.1–1984.4 (Obs.   240) 1985.1–1997.4 (Obs.   312)
Mean SD Max. Min. Mean SD Max. Min.
Manufacturing Industries
W 86.93 28.84 202.9 41.90 104.8 40.96 246.3 41.25
LNWC 1.337 0.071 1.433 1.238 1.328 0.038 1.383 1.232
BNWC 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.076 0.096 1.265 1.000
TLC 115.3 35.31 255.6 58.65 151.4 68.23 405.8 53.23
AW 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 69.88 21.27 136.7 30.79
UNION 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.507 0.285 1.000 0.083
OPEN 0.338 0.257 1.149 0.096 0.575 0.657 3.500 0.102
Q 9.431 6.971 27.42 1.598 9.804 6.784 26.69 1.296
N 17,661 12,763 49,715 4,167 16,543 12,292 42,150 3,897
Notes: W is monthly real wage per production worker in 1988 pesos; LNWC is 1   percent-
age increase in wages due to legal nonwage costs; BNWC is 1   percentage increase in wages
due to bargained nonwage costs; TLC are monthly total real labor costs in 1988 pesos; AW is
the monthly real alternative wage in 1988 pesos; UNION is percentage union; OPEN is de-
gree of openness; Q is production in 1988 million pesos; N is number of production workers;
Obs. is the number of observations; and SD represents standard deviation.
Fig. 8.4 Log changes in employment and wagesmand. However, between 1975 and 1980 there are six nearly consecutive
episodes of a sharp (0.1 or larger) increase in wages followed one or two
quarters later by an equally sharp decrease in wages. It is doubtful that em-
ployers reacted very much to such short-term wage shocks.
8.5 Labor Demand: Empirical Results
8.5.1 Specifying a Model for the Whole Period
To determine whether and how much elasticities and adjustment lags of
labor demand in the manufacturing sector changed after the return of col-
lective bargaining, we must ﬁrst establish the appropriate speciﬁcation of
the empirical model.9 The quarterly data on the six manufacturing indus-
tries described in previous sections was used. To estimate equation (1) as it
stands, the stationarity of the variables must ﬁrst be established, which we
did by estimating the order of integration of employment, labor costs, and
output for each manufacturing industry in the 1975–1997 period. All vari-
ables are nonstationary, but their ﬁrst diﬀerences are stationary so that
they are integrated of ﬁrst order—I(1). The unit root tests used to perform
the analyses were those proposed by Fuller (1976), known as Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF). The models over which the tests were per-
formed were diﬀerent depending on the variable and industry, including
only a constant and lags of the dependent variable in some cases, while in
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Fig. 8.5 Log changes in employment and production
9. We are grateful to John E. Driﬃll for his useful comments as well as to Fernando Lorenzo
for his econometric advice.others they also incorporated seasonals and a time trend (for details, see
table 8A.1). These results are somewhat expected. Regarding employment,
output, and real wages, accumulated knowledge and productivity shocks
have been found to generate stochastic trends in these variables, as was
mentioned in section 8.3. The nonstationarity of the degree of openness
could be interpreted in similar terms, with external shocks and trade poli-
cies at the root of the result. Finally, the most likely explanation for the
stochastic trend found in the union density variable should be linked to
membership dynamics and insider-outsider arguments (Blanchard and
Summers 1986). Given the statistical properties of the data, one possible
strategy is to estimate the model in diﬀerences.
The institutional framework depicted in previous sections suggests, as a
second step, the analysis of the stability of the parameters in time. The
model in diﬀerences was thus estimated industry by industry, using recur-
sive least squares (RLS) and assuming wages and output are exogenous.
The results, depicted in ﬁgure 8.6, show there are structural breaks in the
labor demand equation in all industries except nonmetallic minerals. The
timing of the breaks is not identical in each industry, but breaks can be
identiﬁed at some point in the early 1980s as well as at another point
around 1991–1993. These dates can be clearly related to the major eco-
nomic crisis in 1982–1984; the end of the military regime in 1985; and the
end of government participation in the Wage Councils.
A third stage of the analysis involved using the pooled cross-section time
series data set. Given the nonstationarity of the variables and the instabil-
ity of the parameters, the model was speciﬁed in diﬀerences with the pa-
rameters shifting in various combinations of 1983, 1985, and 1993 and es-
timated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Elasticities were imposed to be
the same for all six industries, while wages and output were taken as ex-
ogenous variables. These results are reported in table 8.3.
The ﬁrst three columns test for a single break in 1983, 1985, and 1993.
The null hypothesis of no shifts cannot be rejected for 1983 and 1993, but
it is rejected for 1985. The output coeﬃcient falls from 0.141 in 1975–1984
to 0.073 in 1985–1997. The wage coeﬃcient becomes smaller in absolute
value terms, going from –0.103 to –0.047. The sum of the two lagged em-
ployment coeﬃcients falls from 0.196 to 0.022. The models in the last two
columns test for multiple break points. Having established a shift in the
early 1980s, these results examine whether there was an additional shift in
1993. In the fourth column, breaks in 1983 and 1993 are included, while in
the ﬁfth column the shifts take place in 1985 and 1993. The joint null hy-
pothesis of no breaks is rejected in both cases.
Finally, cointegration techniques were also applied. When variables are
nonstationary, the estimation of the model in levels has been proven to be
misleading, unless the variables are jointly stationary; that is, they are coin-
tegrated. Hence, cointegration (CI) tests were then done to see if an equi-
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and Granger (EGM) and Johansen (JM) methods were used, specifying
various models that diﬀer in the number of lags included, as well as in the in-
clusion of seasonal dummies or a constant. Cointegration between employ-
ment, production, and labor costs was rejected for all industries according
to at least some of the tests performed (table 8A.2). In those cases in which
CI cannot be rejected, the graph of the CI relation shows it is not stationary
so that it is probably spurious, as is the existence of a structural break in the
relation that makes the statistics signiﬁcant (see ﬁgures 8A.1 to 8A.4). 
In summary, all the previous analyses suggest 1985 stands out on both
institutional and statistical grounds as the date at which a structural
change in labor demand behavior took place. There is also some evidence
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Table 8.3 Estimation in Diﬀerences, Manufacturing Industries, 1975–1997
Structural Breaks
Variable 1983 1985 1993 1983 and 1993 1985 and 1993
Employmentt–1 0.01256 0.04312 0.02399 0.01316 0.03833
(0.0604) (0.0564) (0.0468) (0.0593) (0.0557)
Employmentt–2 0.16010 0.15278 0.09722 0.16832 0.15082
(0.0605) (0.0564) (0.0469) (0.0594) (0.0559)
Productt 0.15244 0.14078 0.12545 0.15180 0.14259
(0.0306) (0.0263) (0.0203) (0.0300) (0.0260)
Waget –0.08480 –0.10309 –0.09007 –0.08364 –0.10675
(0.0296) (0.0234) (0.0224) (0.0291) (0.0264)
Employmentt–1   dummy Year 1 –0.01144 –0.07197 –0.08663 0.01955 –0.06430
(0.0833) (0.0835) (0.1043) (0.0943) (0.0995)
Employmentt–2   dummy Year 1 –0.11730 –0.10185 0.03228 –0.21630 –0.20982
(0.0837) (0.0839) (0.1051) (0.0950) (0.1002)
Productt   dummy Year 1 –0.05929 –0.0679 –0.05994 –0.04599 –0.04991
(0.0374) (0.0349) (0.0388) (0.0410) (0.0430)
Waget   dummy Year 1 0.01234 0.05570 0.09638 –0.01371 0.04344
(0.0424) (0.0244) (0.0704) (0.0449) (0.0507)
Employmentt–1   dummy Year 2 –0.24582 –0.18643
(0.1233) (0.1293)
Employmentt–2   dummy Year 2 0.03721 0.04908
(0.1213) (0.1273)
Productt   dummy Year 2 –0.03598 –0.02352
(0.0430) (0.0473)
Waget   dummy Year 2 0.13014 0.09706
(0.0747) (0.0793)
R2 0.0930 0.1028 0.0922 0.1398 0.1344
Notes: Dependent variable:  Employmentt   Employmentt – Employmentt–1. Variables are in ﬁrst
diﬀerences; Employment is number of production workers; Wage is the real labor cost of a production
worker; dummy Year 1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in the subperiod starting in 1983, 1985, or
1993 according to the column; dummy Year 2 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in the subperiod
starting in 1993. Standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coeﬃcient. No. of observa-
tions   534.of a further shift in the 1990s. These break points will be used in the re-
mainder of the chapter.
8.5.2 Specifying a Model for Each Subperiod
Once we determined 1985 as the breaking point, we ﬁrst repeated the
analysis of order of integration and cointegration of variables for each sub-
sample and each industry. For 1975–1984 and 1985–1997, every variable is
I(1) within each subperiod. Details are reported in tables 8A.3 and 8A.4.
Second, for 1975–1984, the tests using EGM and/or JM report a CI rela-
tion for at least one model (see table 8A.5).10 For 1985–1997, no CI among
employment, labor costs, and production can be found in any industry for
any model using EGM. However, CI is not rejected in any industry once
variables that would reﬂect a bargaining framework—alternative wages,
bargained costs, degree of openness, and union density—are included.
The existence of an equilibrium relation between the variables—according
to the nonrejection of CI—would state that shocks, having a long-lasting
eﬀect on each of the individual variables, alter equilibrium only in a tran-
sitory way. In the ﬁrst subperiod, the result is consistent with a standard
neoclassical labor demand framework. In 1985–1997, however, the need to
include other variables to achieve CI suggests that the framework in which
labor demand has been determined actually changed. One possibility is to
link the existence of a stochastic trend in the residuals to not having mod-
eled technical change. One might argue that this is partially captured when
adding the degree of openness: Increases in openness would force the
diﬀerent industries to invest in new technology once they face greater com-
petitive pressures, or it would force ﬁrms with older technologies to close
so that, on average, technical progress would be observed. However, as not
only openness but variables accounting for bargaining are included in the
CI relation, there is also evidence supporting the premise that a bargaining
framework is in place to analyze the labor demand schedule in 1985–1997.
To further establish whether the return of collective bargaining was a
likely cause of the observed change in parameters, we then performed exo-
geneity tests on wages. In the competitive model, wages are assumed to be
exogenous to the ﬁrm and industry, while in the bargaining model, they are
not. In the latter case they would be set either simultaneously or subject to
the determination of employment. Using a Hausman test (1978) in which
the OLS estimate of the wage parameter is compared to a seemingly unre-
lated regressions estimate (SUR), weak exogeneity of wages cannot be re-
jected in the ﬁrst subperiod while it is rejected in the second.11The SUR es-
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10. The EGM was preferred due to the number of observations available. The JM was used
for paper and chemicals to check if a CI relation could be found.
11. The Hausman statistic is T(bOLS – bSUR)2Var(bOLS – bSUR) – 1, where b is the esti-
mator, by OLS or SUR, and T is the number of observations. It is distributed as a  2 with 1
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Table 8.4 Weak Exogeneity Tests for Wages, 1975–1984 and 1985–1997
1975–1984 1985–1997
Model 1 3.02 5.9
Model 2 — 90.4
Model 3 — 294.2
Model 4 — 226.6
Hausman Statistic 95% conﬁdence 3.84
Notes: Each model contains 5 industry dummies and a constant. In models 1 and 2 labor de-
mand is speciﬁed as a function of wages and output, using 4 lags of every variable. In models
3 and 4 a dummy variable for 1993 is also included in both the labor demand and the wage
equations. In models 1 and 3, instruments used for the wage are just its lags while in models 2
and 4 instruments for the wage include bargaining variables.
timator is calculated using lags of the wage as instruments in both subpe-
riods. For 1985–1997, however, the test was also performed including bar-
gaining variables (degree of openness and union density). Further, given
the evidence on the existence of instability in the 1990s, the statistics were
also calculated, including a dummy variable in the equations, which takes
the value 0 before 1993 and 1 after that date. The values of the statistics for
the diﬀerent models are reported in table 8.4. The results provide further
support for estimating a standard neoclassical labor demand model for
1975–1984 and a bargaining model for 1985–1997. Given all the previous
results, the estimated models are as follows:
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where N refers to number of production workers; w/p are real labor costs
(which after 1985 include bargained costs); Qis production; union is union
density; open is degree of openness; and wa is the alternative wage. The or-
der of the polynomials in the lag operator will be tested empirically, start-
ing with polynomials of order four. The bargaining model is a recursive,
two-equation model, so gains in eﬃciency can be achieved through simul-
taneous estimation. To avoid possible endogeneity bias due to the non-
modeling of output, lag values of Q (up to two lags), seasonals, and indus-
try dummies were used as instruments for this variable in the estimation for
both subperiods. Hence, estimation was done using instrumental variables(IVE) in the ﬁrst subsample and three-stage least squares (3SLS) in the sec-
ond, using PCGive and PCFiml 9.0 software (1996). The data set is the
pooled cross-section time series described previously. Fixed eﬀects per in-
dustry are always allowed for. Elasticities are imposed to be equal for all in-
dustries so that the estimates reﬂect the average elasticities for the whole
manufacturing sector.
8.5.3 Main Results
For both subperiods, table 8.5 reports three simple versions of the labor
demand model. Starting with a model including up to four lags for every
variable, sequential reductions were performed. Further, the diﬀerent co-
eﬃcients were allowed to vary in 1993 in order to check for possible shifts.
We only report the last two steps including the shifts that were signiﬁcant as
well as two lags of employment in column (1) and only previous-quarter em-
ployment in column (2). Column (3) includes the variable OPEN in the la-
bor demand equation, so as to test if increased openness was aﬀecting the
estimates. The wage equation for the bargaining model allows the wage bar-
gain to vary by industry after 1993. This was done to test whether the change
in the bargaining structure has had an overall impact on wage demands and
whether the eﬀect varies by industry. Residuals are not autocorrelated, but
they are heteroskedastic. Thus, standard errors were calculated according
to White (1980). Although normality is rejected, hypothesis testing results
should be robust to nonnormality given the sample size (Spanos 1986).
As can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (2) of the labor demand
results within each subperiod, employment from one quarter ago has an
eﬀect on employment in the current quarter, but employment from two
quarters ago has no impact. Further, the degree of openness is not only sta-
tistically nonsigniﬁcant, but does not alter the estimates of the relevant
elasticities. Accordingly, our attention will focus on the results for column
(2). These show three major results:
1. The output coeﬃcient falls from 0.093 in 1975–1984 to 0.040 in 1985–
1997.
2. The wage coeﬃcient falls (in absolute value) from –0.102 in 1975–
1984 to –0.039 in 1985–1997.
3. There is no signiﬁcant change in the impact of lagged employment
between these two periods.
The wage equation results show that the eﬀect of union density on wages
decreased signiﬁcantly after 1992, although the extent of this change varies
per industry.12 A key ﬁnding in the wage equation results is that bargained
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12. The negative eﬀect of unions on wages should be taken just as an indicator of changes
in the bargaining regime by the mid-1990s. The available number of temporal observations is
not enough to estimate diﬀerent models for the subperiods, so structural breaks in this case
are used to capture possible shifts and not as a quantitative assessment.Table 8.5 Estimates of Labor Demand and Wage Equations: Manufacturing
Industries
Sample: 1975–1984 Sample: 1985–1997
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Labor Demand Equation: dependent variable: Nt
Constant 1.4969 1.3840 1.5638 1.3403 1.3630 1.3526
(0.2980) (0.3012) (0.3338) (0.2333) (0.2187) (0.2186)
Nt–1 0.90382 0.88844 0.87473 0.79468 0.86921 0.87186
(0.1299) (0.0315) (0.0330) (0.0625) (0.0218) (0.0202)
Nt–2 –0.01477 0.07809
(0.1181) (0.0588)
Qt 0.09074 0.0930 0.09092 0.03912 0.04024 0.03309
(0.0261) (0.0244) (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0173)
Wt –0.10000 –0.10180 –0.09865 –0.04098 –0.03886 –0.03882
(0.0227) (0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0184) (0.0172)
DUMMY93 –0.03957 –0.04019 –0.0393
(0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0122)
IND.31 –0.04217 –0.04499 –0.07533 0.08076 0.08336 0.08755
(0.0285) (0.0271) (0.0357) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0250)
IND.32 0.03857 0.03757 0.02439 0.08019 0.08335 0.08357
(0.0247) (0.0267) (0.0296) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0202)
IND.34 0.02271 0.02498 –0.03521 –0.05909 –0.06096 –0.06533
(0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0442) (0.0209) (0.0214) (0.0238)
IND.35 –0.10358 –0.10557 –0.15528 –0.04310 –0.04563 –0.04006
(0.0242) (0.0221) (0.0409) (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0201)
IND.36 –0.04382 –0.04285 –0.10538 –0.07504 –0.07684 –0.08307
(0.0243) (0.0233) (0.0460) (0.0279) (0.0283) (0.0279)
Qr.1 –0.01536 –0.01524 –0.01451 0.00098 –0.00019 –0.00111
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0080)
Qr.2 0.00815 0.00783 0.00846 0.01122 0.01031 0.00996
(0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0053)
Qr.3 –0.01340 –0.01323 –0.01286 –0.01589 –0.01778 –0.01793
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0067)
OPEN –0.07185 –0.00090
(0.0532) (0.0092)
No. of observations 228 228 228 300 300 300
R2 0.9946 0.9947 0.9947 0.9967 0.9967 0.9967
AR 1-4 3.3058 3.5757 3.9374 1.2294 1.7403 1.7430
[0.5080] [0.4665] [0.4145] [0.8732] [0.7834] [0.7829]
Normality 143.0 138.0 131.7 60.4 56.6 56.7
[0.0000]∗∗ [0.0000]∗∗ [0.0000]∗∗ [0.0000]∗∗ [0.0000]∗∗ [0.0000]∗∗
 2 2.9151 2.272 2.309 1.5052 1.7656 1.5585
[0.0002]∗∗ [0.0067]∗∗ [0.0039]∗∗ [0.0353]∗ [0.0074]∗∗ [0.0247]∗∗
Sample: 1985–1997
(1) (2) (3)
Wage Equation: dependent variable: W t
Constant –0.29674 –0.27408 –0.27471
(0.1068) (0.1041) (0.1041)







AWt 0.71198 0.72145 0.72126
(0.0523) (0.0540) (0.0540)
OPENt –0.02471 –0.02426 –0.02424
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
UNIONt 0.15515 0.15477 0.15470
(0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0229)
UNION93t –0.23953 –0.23432 –0.23437
(0.0693) (0.0703) (0.0703)
UNION93t   Ind.31 0.05711 0.06146 0.06161
(0.0846) (0.0862) (0.0862)
UNION93t   Ind.32 –0.14993 –0.14841 –0.14815
(0.0784) (0.0809) (0.0809)
UNION93t   Ind.34 –0.04242 –0.03842 –0.03838
(0.0745) (0.0763) (0.0762)
UNION93t   Ind.35 0.17082 0.17512 0.17504
(0.0616) (0.0627) (0.0626)
UNION93t   Ind.36 –0.89888 –0.89890 –0.89809
(0.2909) (0.2934) (0.2935)
DUMMY93 0.10029 0.10001 0.09997
(0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0331)
Qr.1 –0.04555 –0.04357 –0.04358
(0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Qr.2 0.01220 0.02054 0.02056
(0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0086)
Qr.3 0.01208 0.00984 0.00985
(0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0083)
No. of observations 300 300 300
R2 0.9780 0.9782 0.9782
AR 1-4 1.9425 1.6430 1.6429
[0.7530] [0.7928] [0.7927]
Normality 7.74 7.85 7.85
[0.0209]∗ [0.0198]∗ [0.0198]∗∗
 2 1.9445 2.0968 1.9892
[0.0014]∗∗ [0.0006]∗∗ [0.0010]∗∗
Notes: N is number of production workers; W is the real labor cost of a production worker; Q
is production; AW is the alternative wage; UNION is union density; OPEN is the degree of
openness; Qr.j is a dummy variable for quarter j; Ind.i is a dummy variable for industry i;
DUMMY93 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in 1993–1997; UNION93 is UNION multiplied
by DUMMY93. Industries reported are: food, beverage, and tobacco (31); textiles and ap-
parel (32); paper (34); chemicals (36); nonmetallic minerals (36); metal products (38). Mod-
els (1) and (2) diﬀer in that the former includes 2 lags of the dependent variable, while the lat-
ter only includes 1. Model 3 includes the variable OPEN in the labor demand equation.
Variables are in logs, except for UNION; OPEN and binary variables. Corrected (according
to White, 1980) standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated coeﬃcient. AR 1-4
is a test of autocorrelation of order 4 in the residuals; Normality is Jarque-Bera’s test;  2 is a
test for heteroskedasticity of the residuals, using all variables and their squared value in the
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Table 8.6 Labor Demand Parameters: Manufacturing Industries, 1975–1997
1975–1984 1985–1997
Variable Estimate Conﬁdence Interval Estimate Conﬁdence Interval
Short Run Estimates
Production 0.09304 (0.045, 0.141) 0.040243 (0.007, 0.087)
Labor costs –0.10180 (–0.137, –0.066) –0.03886 (–0.075, –0.003)
Lagged employment 0.88844 (0.827, 0.950) 0.86921 (0.826, 0.912)
Long Run Estimates
Production 0.8339 (0.525, 1.143) 0.3077 (0.080, 0.536)
Labor costs –0.9125 (–1.368, –0.457) –0.2971 (–0.534, –0.060)
Labor share (sL) 0.248 0.257
Wage elasticity of 
labor demand 0.69 0.22
Notes: sL is equal to the wage bill (all wage and nonwage costs included) divided by value added. The
wage elasticity of labor demand is equal to –(1 – sL)    , where   is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor and is given by the estimated coeﬃcient of the wage in the labor demand equation.
wages fall with increased openness. The eﬀect is rather small, however—a
50 point change in openness being associated with a 1.5 percent change in
the bargained wage.
Because of the diﬀerent approaches taken to estimating the IVE labor
demand and the 3SLS bargaining model, one might wonder if these ﬁnd-
ings are sensitive to the choice of estimation method or to the inclusion/ex-
clusion of variables in the model. To put the two subperiods on an equal
footing, both models were nested in a two-equation system and estimated
by 3SLS. In order to do so, each variable was multiplied by two binary vari-
ables—one for 1975–1984, another for 1985–97—so that X75 equals X in
1975–1984 and 0 after that date, and X85 is equal to X in 1985–1997 and 0
before that date. Tests of signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients and tests of coeﬃcients
being equal before and after 1985 were performed, and they all reinforce
the previous results (see table 8A.5).
In tables 8.6 and 8.7, labor demand elasticities and results for other rel-
evant parameters are summarized, using models (2) of the previous table.
Conﬁdence intervals are also reported. These results show that the wage
elasticity of labor demand dropped from 0.69 in 1975–1984 to 0.22 in
1985–1997. The employment-output elasticity fell by more than 50 per-
cent, from 0.83 to 0.31.
The estimated speed of adjustment is the same in both periods, about
ﬁve quarters, so that there is no evidence that the return of bargaining
lengthened the amount of time needed for employment to adjust, which is
contrary to what one might generally expect.13
13. An exception is the paper by Lockwood and Manning (1989) in which the opposite re-
sult is found.Although the estimates might be biased downward due to the omission
of hiring and ﬁring costs, the evidence of a decline between both subperi-
ods is quite robust. The smaller responses of employment to changes in
output and wages are consistent with collective bargaining restricting the
options available to employers. Once unions reappeared and started play-
ing a role in wage setting, the rules of the game changed. Costs of hiring
and ﬁring workers were expected to increase because of union resistance.
Employment would not adjust to changing output demand as before be-
cause of increased uncertainty on the reaction of unions. Hence, there
would have been more labor hoarding during slowdowns and increased use
of overtime work during upswings than when unions were not active.
After 1992 the structure of bargaining changed, so that ﬁrm-level nego-
tiations became quite common in some industries. The eﬀect of this insti-
tutional change is captured in both the labor demand and the wage equa-
tions, but in diﬀerent ways. In 1993 the labor demand equation has shifted
in, while the other estimated coeﬃcients are stable. Regarding the wage, the
estimated eﬀect is an overall increase in wages but with a reduction of the
impact of union power on the markup that is diﬀerent per industry. Indus-
tries that have experienced a greater reduction of this positive eﬀect are
those in which ﬁrm-level negotiations have become more common. Hence,
while no signiﬁcant change is detected in chemicals (35)—a concentrated
industry in which public ﬁrms are present—in nonmetallic minerals (36),
union power has become less eﬀective in increasing the markup over alter-
native income. The estimated long-run eﬀect of unions is to increase wages
by 1.5 percent per each 10 percent increase in coverage in 1985–1992.
Given the changes that took place in the 1990s, the average eﬀect is almost
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Table 8.7 Impact of Key Variables on Real Labor Costs: Manufacturing Industries,
1985–1997
Short Run Long Run
Variable Estimate Conﬁdence Interval Estimate Conﬁdence Interval
Openness –0.02426 (–0.045, –0.003) –0.04256 (–0.075, –0.010)
Alternative wage 0.72145 (0.616, 0.827) 1.26580 (1.175, 1.356)
Lagged wage 0.43003 (0.351, 0.509)
Union 1985/92 0.15477 (0.110, 0.200) 0.27154 (0.215, 0.328)
Union 1993/97
Ind.31 –0.01809 (–0.176, 0.140) –0.03174 (–0.328, 0.265)
Ind.32 –0.22796 (–0.384, –0.072) –0.39995 (–0.722, –0.078)
Ind.34 –0.11797 (–0.246, 0.010) –0.20698 (–0.451, 0.037)
Ind.35 0.09557 (0.031, 0.159) 0.16767 (0.062, 0.273)
Ind.36 –0.97846 (–1.585, –0.372) –1.71670 (–2.756, –0.677)
Ind.38 –0.07955 (–0.215, 0.056) –0.13957 (–0.387, 0.108)
Note: Industries are food, beverage, and tobacco (31); textiles and apparel (32); paper (34); chemicals
(36); nonmetallic minerals (36); metal products (38).null for the whole period.14 The indirect eﬀect of unions over employment
via wages is such that an increase in coverage of 10 percentage points is as-
sociated with a 0.8 percent decline in labor demand before 1993.
As almost every parameter changed, a simulation was done using both
models in order to capture all possible eﬀects. First, the wage was calcu-
lated for the period 1985–1997 using an ARIMA(4,1,0) model estimated
using data for 1975–1984. Comparing the average value of the estimated
wage with the actual average value, the result is that wages were 46 percent
higher than what they would have been had no changes occurred. For
1975–1984, the same exercise shows that actual wages in the period were 18
percent lower than what they would have been if there had been bargain-
ing over wages and a union density equal to its average value in 1985–1997
(see ﬁgures 8.7 and 8.8).
Second, using actual wages and the two speciﬁcations of the labor de-
mand equation, the estimated eﬀect of the diﬀerent regimes on labor de-
mand is that the employment level in 1985–1997 was 9 percent higher than
what it would have been according to the 1975–1984 model. This is the
combined eﬀect of the decrease in the output and wage parameters. Ac-
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14. These eﬀects are calculated at the mean value of UNION.
Fig. 8.7 Labor costs 1975–1984 assuming the existence of unions
Fig. 8.8 Labor costs 1986–1997 assuming there were no unionscordingly, in 1975–1984, employment would have been 5 percent higher
than its observed level if elasticities had been those stemming from the bar-
gaining model (see ﬁgures 8.9 and 8.10).
Finally, considering both the estimated wage level and the change in elas-
ticities, the employment level in 1985–1997 was 24 percent lower than what
it would have been if wages had followed the 1975–1984 ARIMA(4,1,0)
model and elasticities had been those according to the 1975–1984 labor de-
mand equation. In 1975–1984, on the contrary, if wages had been those
predicted by the bargaining model and elasticities had had the values esti-
mated with this same model, then the employment level would have been 1
percent lower than what it actually was (see ﬁgures 8.11 and 8.12). In sum-
mary, unions could have prevented wages from falling as much as they did
before 1985 at the cost of a 1 percent employment loss while, if unions had
not been reinstated, employment would have been 24 percent higher, but at
the cost of a much lower level of earnings.
These ﬁgures should be considered only as rough indicators. The
ARIMA(4,1,0) model for wages, as well as the 1975–1984 model for em-
ployment, do not take into account the 1993 estimated shifts and the role
that variables such as output and terms of trade would have played after
1985 in the absence of a regime change. These might be linked to structural
reforms and productivity gains brought about by increased openness.
Hence, the simulated paths in 1985–1997 are overestimated in the former
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Fig. 8.9 Employment 1986–1997 assuming there were no unions but using actual
wages
Fig. 8.10 Employment 1975–1984 assuming the existence of unions but using
actual wagescase, while they are underestimated in the latter using the 1975–1984 mod-
els (simulated wage gains and employment losses are smaller than simu-
lated).
All the results discussed above stem from a model for the whole manu-
facturing sector using industry data in which output and wage elasticities
of labor demand were assumed to be the same for all industries. A natural
question is if this last assumption holds and, if not, if it is biasing the re-
sults signiﬁcantly. To address the issue, all the coeﬃcients were allowed to
vary per industry in both subperiods and the restriction imposed was
tested. In 1975–1984, the hypothesis of common elasticities and speed of
adjustment was not rejected. For 1985–1997 the wage elasticity and the
lagged employment coeﬃcient were statistically equal among industries,
while a unique output elasticity was rejected. Paper and chemicals have a
signiﬁcantly smaller elasticity. However, the average elasticity for the man-
ufacturing sector estimated using this model is only slightly higher, while
the wage elasticity and the parameter accounting for the speed of adjust-
ment do not show important biases.15
Although such similarity between industries is not expected to hold a
priori, the statistical result supports the estimation procedure followed us-
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Fig. 8.11 Employment 1975–1984 assuming the existence of unions
Fig. 8.12 Employment 1986–1997 assuming there were no unions
15. Results are available upon request.ing the pooled cross-section time series data set. Further, the decline in the
elasticities holds, no matter how much the amount in which they decreased
might be overstated.
Even though no direct bargaining over employment has been observed,
all our ﬁndings suggest that unions have had an eﬀect on labor demand.
This has taken place through two mechanisms. First, reunionization
changed the way wages were set. Bargaining over wage levels has been
done, taking into account the likely eﬀects on the labor demand schedule
and outside opportunities for those that would eventually be unemployed.
Industries that have been most exposed to competition have registered
lower markups than the rest. Union membership, which has declined sys-
tematically all along the period, raised the markup during the 1980s. At the
beginning of the 1990s, and probably as a consequence of the progressive
decentralization of bargaining and nonenforcement of contracts, this
eﬀect has vanished in some industries, while in others it has even become
negative. Increased openness also has tempered wage demands by unions.
Second, unions have eﬀectively altered the labor demand choice set for
employers. Output and wage elasticities have gone down, and union resis-
tance is one of the probable causes. As unions forced wages up and more
limits were posed to pass that increase onto prices, ﬁrms have been forced
to adjust employment to cyclical variations of demand less than before.
Further, expected union resistance has probably been at the root of a
smaller adjustment of employment to wage increases. As a result of all
these changes, wages are higher and employment is lower today than what
they would have been if no institutional changes had taken place.
8.6 The Eﬀect of Unions on Employment Adjustment: Other Evidence
Two lines of research were followed in order to further analyze the im-
pact of unions on the labor market, focusing on how they aﬀect employ-
ment adjustment. A ﬁrst approach to the study of labor dynamics was car-
ried out, looking for evidence on the impact of unions on the employment
path to equilibrium. Second, the eﬀect of unions on layoﬀ rates was exam-
ined, performing the analysis for the whole economy and not just for the
manufacturing sector.
8.6.1 Dynamic Labor Demand
Although the conventional wisdom is that unions lengthen the time
needed for labor demand adjustment, the estimates in table 8.5 show no
change between 1975–1984 and 1985–1997. It is possible that a simple be-
fore-after comparison fails to yield an accurate assessment of union impact
because of other changes that were taking place in 1985–1997. In particu-
lar, the opening of the Uruguayan economy could have shortened adjust-
ment lags at the same time that unionization was lengthening them.
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ment is itself a function of some variables related to changing the level of
employment. This would imply that in equation (5),     (act), with ac a
vector of variables accounting for adjustment costs, that would hence in-
teract with lagged employment (Burgess, 1988, 1989; Burgess and Dolado
1989). Variables that will be included are union density and the openness
ratio. Union density should reﬂect implicit costs of ﬁring workers as well
as potential restrictions on the hiring of new workers. On the other hand,
when there is more openness, it is quite likely that employers are subject to
greater competitive pressure to compete both abroad and domestically,
leading to shorter adjustment lags.
Three models are considered in table 8.8: (1) percentage union interacts
with lagged employment; (2) openness interacts with lagged employment,
and (3) complete interactions among percentage union, openness, and
lagged employment. Linear eﬀects are included (and interacted in the third
model); otherwise, the interaction coeﬃcients could be interpreted as prox-
ies for linear eﬀects omitted from the model. As shown in columns (1) and
(2), the simple interactions with percentage union and openness are posi-
tive and negative, respectively, as expected, but estimated with little preci-
sion. In the model with complete interactions in column (3), the coeﬃcient
for lagged employment decreases with openness but also with percentage
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Table 8.8 Estimates of Dynamic Labor Demand Equations, 1985–1997
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Nt–1 0.876 0.889 0.902
(0.028) (0.025) (0.038)
Qt 0.056 0.055 0.073
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
W t –0.034 –0.032 –0.060
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018)








OPEN   UNION –0.882
(1.226)
Nt–1   OPEN   UNION 0.108
(0.134)
SEE 0.044 0.044 0.043
Notes: Each equation also contains three seasonal dummies, ﬁve industry dummies, a shift
parameter for the 1993–1997 period, and a constant. Each equation is estimated by 3SLS
along with a wage equation that includes the same variables as in column (2) of table 8.5.union. In any case, neither coeﬃcient is estimated with an acceptable de-
gree of precision. Openness also was included in the wage-bargaining
equation and consistently had a negative eﬀect on the negotiated wage. An
increase in openness from 30 to 60 percent is associated with a 1.7 percent
reduction in wages.
These results are not as robust as those related to the static labor de-
mand. However, as a ﬁrst approach to employment dynamics, they do sug-
gest that low openness in 1985–1992 led to longer lags for employment ad-
justment, compared to 1975–1984. However, with the increase in openness
in the 1990s, the lags quickly shortened and by 1997 were shorter than they
were in 1984. The overall eﬀect for the entire 1985–1997 period is an aver-
age lag similar to that prevailing for 1975–1984, which is what we reported
in table 8.5. Regarding the union eﬀect, no conclusions can be drawn at this
stage. A more complex speciﬁcation for the   parameter might be needed,
possibly accounting for diﬀerent eﬀects per industry from 1993 onward,
but this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
8.6.2 Labor Mobility
The results in section 8.5 showed that labor demand became less re-
sponsive to changes in output and wages after the return of collective bar-
gaining in 1985. What we do not know is if unions aﬀect employment ad-
justment, given that the results in section 8.6.1 were not robust. This is an
important question because the success of any policy designed to make the
Uruguayan labor market more ﬂexible will hinge on the precise mecha-
nisms through which unions inﬂuence employment.
Unionization could be correlated with slower employment adjustment
because higher wages for union members virtually eliminate all voluntary
turnover. In this case, policy would have to be directed toward the bar-
gaining power of unions. Another possibility is that union threats of wild-
cat strikes are suﬃcient to prevent management from ever conducting lay-
oﬀs. In this case, policy would need to be targeted at strike behavior.
We do not have data on ﬂows in and out of the ﬁrm that would allow us
to decompose employment changes into changes in hiring, layoﬀs, and quits
(including retirement) and get more meaningful insights into union inﬂu-
ence. As a second-best strategy, this section examines household survey
data on unemployment, quits, and layoﬀs. If unionization has resulted in
smaller responses of employment to changes in wages or output, this eﬀect
should be echoed by some combination of a lower hiring rate, a lower quit
rate, and a lower layoﬀrate. The emphasis here will be on the eﬀect of unions
on layoﬀ rates.16 The analysis will be done using data for all economic sec-
tors, not just manufacturing. Because of possible ambiguity in the responses
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16. Data on new hires are only available since 1991, and quits are only observed if they re-
sult in unemployment.to questions about events initiating unemployment, we report results not
just on layoﬀs, but also for all unemployment and quits resulting in unem-
ployment. In addition to gaining insights into how unions inﬂuence em-
ployment adjustment, these results will help determine whether the conclu-
sions for manufacturing industries are generalizable for the entire economy.
Further, there is a sizable literature on how unions aﬀect various forms
of turnover, which provides some insights into models of union behavior.
It has been well established since Freeman (1980) that unionization is as-
sociated with much lower quit rates. The reasons for this correlation re-
main unsettled. Freeman argues that if unions provide employees with a
constructive channel for settling disagreements at the workplace, they will
be less likely to quit. Pay compression within unionized workplaces further
reduces the quits of employees who receive the largest relative beneﬁts—
the least skilled and the youngest. Others have argued that the correlation
simply reﬂects the fact that the wage level is an inadequate measure for the
rents received by union members; with a better measure of such rents, the
impact of unions would vanish.
The impact of unions on layoﬀ rates is more diﬃcult to predict. In a
framework where the welfare of each union member gets equal weight in
the aggregate union preference function, one would expect the union to
push for job security for all members. Today, however, most models pre-
suppose the existence of politically dominant coalitions of workers within
the union, usually the most senior members. In such a setting, only mem-
bers of the dominant group are sheltered from layoﬀs. A further compli-
cating factor is the availability and level of unemployment beneﬁts. In the
United States, unions have traditionally used layoﬀs by seniority and un-
employment beneﬁts to buﬀer their most senior members from economic
ﬂuctuations. Medoﬀ (1979) found that layoﬀ rates are actually higher for
union members than nonunion workers. However, in the public sector in
the United States, Allen (1988) found that union members were less likely
to be laid oﬀthan nonunion workers. The unemployment insurance system
in Uruguay provides a much lower replacement rate of income (50 per-
cent–75 percent of the previous monthly wage, capped up to seven mini-
mum wages) than comparable systems in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community, so one might expect Uruguayan unions to place a higher
priority on avoiding layoﬀs at all costs. Unions can signiﬁcantly increase
the transactions costs associated with layoﬀs. The obligations of a non-
union employer are limited to severance pay. Unions can create additional
costs, including work stoppages and slowdowns.17
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17. Initially we planned to include union contract data on severance payments beyond those
required by national regulations as part of this exercise. Upon studying the contracts, however,
we learned that such payments are negotiated on an as-needed basis, rather than being part of
an explicit contractual arrangement. These arranged payments can be quite substantial, as
shown in our case study of the banking sector in Cassoni, Labadie, and Allen (1995).Due to the changes that have taken place, it is important to allow the
eﬀect of unions on layoﬀs to vary within the 1985–1997 period.
Models and Data
To estimate the impact of collective bargaining on labor mobility, ideally
one would estimate hazard rates for employment, both overall and sepa-
rately for quits and layoﬀs. There are no panel surveys of households in
Uruguay and no repeated cross sections with data on completed spells of
employment (or unemployment for that matter). The monthly household
survey can be used to identify experienced workers who are unemployed,
the sector and industry of their last job, and the reason for leaving their last
job. Workers are deﬁned as laid oﬀ if they say they lost their last job be-
cause they were “ﬁred” or the “plant or company closed.” Workers who say
they were suspended from work or who are receiving unemployment in-
surance are excluded from this deﬁnition because of the ambiguity of
whether a separation has occurred. All other separations leading to unem-
ployment (including those who gave a reason for leaving their last job that
was coded as “other”) are deﬁned as quits.
A new questionnaire was adopted for the household survey in 1991. The
survey items used to identify layoﬀs were not changed, but the wording and
number of options for quits were substantially altered. This makes it im-
possible to estimate models of speciﬁc types of quit behavior, such as quits
for low pay or quits to return to school. As long as quits are deﬁned
broadly, there does not seem to be any signiﬁcant break in the series be-
tween 1990 and 1991 (see table 8.9).
The quit-layoﬀ distinction can be problematic empirically. Interviews
with employers about the reasons for a separation would no doubt yield
diﬀerent answers than the household survey. In addition, the timing of the
decision and the stated rationale can conceal as well as reveal, for example,
workers may quit so as to avoid any stigma associated with dismissal. Ac-
cordingly, this study also examines the odds that an experienced worker is
unemployed, ignoring the stated reason. This latter measure includes indi-
viduals who have been suspended or who are receiving unemployment
beneﬁts.
A clear limitation of this approach is that we do not observe cases where
persons leave their job without an intervening spell of unemployment. This
is unlikely to be too much of a problem with the analysis of layoﬀs—even
with advance notice (which is not required in Uruguay); very few job los-
ers are able to ﬁnd a new position before their old one ends. Diﬃculties are
more likely in interpreting the results on quits. Simple errors in measure-
ment make this study less likely to reject any null hypothesis. Nonetheless,
we must emphasize that the results here deal with only one dimension of
quit behavior—quits followed by unemployment—and may not be gener-
alizable to all quits.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Probit equations for unemployment, quits, and layoﬀs are estimated
over all experienced wage and salary workers in the household survey for
1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990, and 1991–1996. Data for 1981 and 1982 are
available only for the second half of the year. Union membership is not
measured in the household survey. It was calculated as stated in section 8.4.
Other variables included in the analysis include employment in the public
sector, age, age squared, sex, years of schooling, percentage informal in the
last industry of employment (as indicated by lack of health coverage),18
marital status (one variable indicating married, spouse present), industry
(two variables ﬂagging manufacturing and construction—the industries
with the most layoﬀs and unemployment), and quarter (three variables).
Means and Trends
Descriptive statistics for the main dependent and explanatory variables
are reported in table 8.9.
Unemployment ranges between 7 and 12 percent over the sample pe-
riod. These ﬁgures are lower than reported unemployment rates, mainly
because ﬁrst-time job seekers are not included in our sample (we also ex-
clude self-employed and unpaid workers). The peak periods of unemploy-
ment are the global recession of 1982–1984 and 1995–1996, when Argen-
tina was experiencing very high unemployment. Quit unemploymenttracks
the overall unemployment rate fairly closely.
The percentage of the labor force on layoﬀ is much higher in the 1990s
than in the 1980s, reaching a maximum of 5 percent in 1996. This is almost
twice as large as the layoﬀ percentage in 1982, even though the overall un-
employment rates for experienced workers in the two years are both
around 12 percent. Layoﬀ percentages in 1992 and 1994 averaged 2.4 per-
cent, despite low overall unemployment near 8 percent. In comparison, the
layoﬀpercentage in 1982 was 2.6 percent, although the unemployment rate
was 12.4 percent.
Union density varies signiﬁcantly through the sample period. Keep in
mind that there was no collective bargaining through 1984; the values re-
ported in table 8.9 for 1981–1986 are based on 1987 data. They are used to
control for unobserved industry eﬀects that are correlated with union den-
sity. (They vary from year to year because of changing industry composi-
tion of employment.) The mean value of percentage unionized dropped
from 30 percent in 1986 to 17 percent in 1996. The decline is fairly gradual,
except for a sharp four-point drop between 1995 and 1996. Union density
declined by 10 or more percentage points in food and beverages, textiles
and clothing, transportation and communication, and ﬁnancial services in
the 1990s.
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18. There is legal mandatory health coverage by social security for those who work in the
private sector. The Household Survey poses questions that refer speciﬁcally to health. Hence,
those that report not having the mandatory coverage are deﬁned as informal workers for the
purposes of this study.Probit Results
The impact of unions varies markedly over the time period (see table
8.10). It is no surprise that in 1981 and 1982 the percentage union variable
(which is acting in those years as a proxy for union sentiment or conditions
making a sector conducive to union organization) is uncorrelated with
layoﬀ, quit, or unemployment odds.
By 1984, unions had become a powerful political force, organizing
strikes and demonstrations in an eﬀort to pressure the military government
to step down. Percentage union is associated with lower odds of unem-
ployment in 1984, all of which results from fewer quits into unemployment
in unionized industries. This behavior probably reﬂects anticipation of a
return to democracy and the restoration of collective bargaining. There is
also some indication that layoﬀ rates in sectors of the economy that were
to become unionized had already become slightly lower than layoﬀrates in
sectors that were to stay nonunion. The union coeﬃcient in the layoﬀ pro-
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Table 8.10 Transformed Coeﬃcients and Standard Errors of Union Coeﬃcient in
Probit Estimates
Unemployed Laid Oﬀ Quit and Unemployed
Year (yes   1) (yes   1) (yes   1)
1981 0.008 –0.006 0.011
(0.024) (0.006) (0.020)
1982 0.059 –0.005 0.029
(0.032) (0.013) (0.024)
1984 –0.109 –0.016 –0.066
(0.026) (0.010) (0.021)
1986 –0.065 –0.027 –0.025
(0.025) (0.009) (0.021)
1990 –0.065 –0.011 –0.018
(0.021) (0.006) (0.016)
1991 –0.032 –0.008 –0.023
(0.019) (0.008) (0.016)
1992 –0.053 –0.016 –0.034
(0.021) (0.009) (0.018)
1993 –0.054 -0.014 –0.035
(0.019) (0.007) (0.016)
1994 –0.040 –0.021 –0.004
(0.019) (0.008) (0.016)
1995 –0.088 –0.033 –0.047
(0.026) (0.013) (0.021)
1996 –0.135 –0.084 –0.041
(0.027) (0.016) (0.020)
Notes: Coeﬃcients indicate change in probability resulting from a change in fraction union-
ized; standard errors appear in parentheses. Control variables include fraction employed in
informal sector (as proxied by health insurance coverage), employment in public sector (yes
  1), age, age squared, male, years of schooling, married, industry (dummies for manufac-
turing and construction), and quarter.bit increased from –0.005 in 1982 to –0.016 in 1984 (although the latter
eﬀect is not estimated with a high degree of precision).
The picture changes further by 1986, when percentage union (based on
1987 data, as in 1981–1982 and 1984) is now strongly associated with lower
layoﬀ odds. Unionization is associated with a 1 to 2 percentage point re-
duction in layoﬀodds in most years between 1986 and 1994. This may seem
modest in absolute terms, but keep in mind that the mean layoﬀ rate varies
between 1.5 and 2.4 percent over this period. Assuming a mean unioniza-
tion of 25 percent, a mean layoﬀ rate of 2 percent, and a union-nonunion
diﬀerence in layoﬀ rates of 1.5 percent, this implies that the odds of layoﬀ
for a union worker are 0.9 percent versus 2.4 percent for a nonunion worker.
Even though union density was declining and unionized companies were
more exposed to global competition, the estimated eﬀect of unions on layoﬀs
actually stayed quite strong in 1995 and 1996. The aggregate layoﬀ rate in-
creased to 3.6 percent in 1995 and 4.9 percent in 1996. The impact of unions
increased to 3.3 percent in 1995. Based on this coeﬃcient and the means of
the key variables, this result implies that the layoﬀ odds for a union worker
were 1.0 percent versus 4.3 percent for a nonunion worker. Compared to pre-
vious years, all of the increase in layoﬀrisk was borne by nonunion workers.
The results for 1996 are too strong; the union coeﬃcient in the layoﬀand un-
employment probits is larger than the mean layoﬀ and unemployment rate.
The increase in the union-nonunion gap in layoﬀ rates might seem puz-
zling in light of the decline in union density. One might argue that union
members are self-selecting into ﬁrms with lower turnover, but the model
controls for the odds that a worker is in the informal sector, where mobil-
ity would be greatest. Another possibility is that the remaining union
workers have higher tenure (relative to nonunion workers) in 1995 and
1996 than in previous years, but the data show that this diﬀerence (1.2
years) is the same in 1995 and 1996 as in 1991–1994. The most logical pos-
sibility is that the unions that did survive until 1995–1996 were the most
powerful ones. Layoﬀ rates in those ﬁrms stayed at 1 percent, while those
in the nonunion sector increased dramatically.
The overall implication of these results is that the layoﬀodds of a worker
in a unionized sector were less than 1 percent from 1986 through 1996. Any
ﬂuctuation in aggregate layoﬀrates reﬂected adjustments by nonunion em-
ployers.
Even with near-zero layoﬀ rates, unionized employers still have some
freedom to make changes in employment if the quit rate is suﬃciently high.
This is not the case in Uruguay. Instead, employer ﬂexibility in unionized
enterprises is especially hampered by very low quit rates. The size of the
eﬀect varies from year to year between 1984 and 1994, but in most years it
is close to a 3 percentage point diﬀerence in the odds of quitting and be-
coming unemployed between workers in a fully unionized and a fully
nonunion industry. The impact of unions on quits resulting in unemploy-
ment rises in 1995 and 1996.
478 Adriana Cassoni, Steven G. Allen, and Gaston J. LabadieIn summary, the change in labor demand elasticities observed at the in-
dustry level of aggregation is no optical illusion. What we see at the micro,
individual-worker level matches what we see at the industry level—employ-
ment now adjusts less than it would have in the absence of unions. What
makes these results all the more convincing is that the same measure of union
density used for 1986–1996 has no eﬀect on unemployment, quits, or layoﬀs
when applied retrospectively to 1981–1982. Eﬀects on quits (and a weak ef-
fect on layoﬀs) begin to appear in 1984 as unions became more active, but
the full eﬀect on layoﬀs is not present until bargaining had oﬃcially resumed.
8.7 Conclusions
This study has examined a unique situation in Uruguay where before-after
comparisons about the impact of collective bargaining can be made. During
the period under study there were three distinct regimes: (1) 1975–1984,
when bargaining was banned, (2) 1985–1991, when there was tripartite bar-
gaining, and (3) 1992–1997, when there was bargaining without government
involvement. During the third regime, the economy became much more
open, which would presumably also have an eﬀect on bargaining results.
We have reported strong evidence of a change in economic behavior af-
ter 1985. Recursive residuals show structural shifts in ﬁve of six industries,
with the shifts coming at about the same time as the regime changes. These
breaks are also signiﬁcant in a model speciﬁed in diﬀerences. Cointegra-
tion of employment, output, and labor costs is rejected for the whole pe-
riod. Wages are exogenous to employment before 1985, but not afterwards.
Based on this evidence we estimated a standard IVE labor demand
model for 1975–1984 and a right-to-manage bargaining model for 1985–
1997. The results showed that the long-run wage elasticity of labor demand
and the employment-output elasticity fell sharply. Although there was no
overall change in the amount of time needed for employment adjustment,
a detailed examination of the 1985–1997 period suggested that the in-
creased lag created by collective bargaining may have been oﬀset by a
shorter lag created by greater openness.
The bargaining model results indicated that unions signiﬁcantly raised
wages in 1985–1992. Afterward, the change in bargaining structure and in-
creased openness had a pronounced eﬀect on bargaining outcomes. Labor
demand shifted to the left from 1993 onward. The union wage diﬀerential
vanished in 1993 in four industries where there were sharp increases in
openness and sharp declines in percentage union. Wages in the chemical
and oil industry were not aﬀected very much. Although that industry be-
came more open, it has remained heavily unionized, which is no doubt a
consequence of state ownership.
What would have happened to wages and employment had the ban on
unions been maintained? To build a counterfactual, we estimated an
ARIMA(4,1,0) model of wages for 1975–1984, which was used to project a
Unions and Employment in Uruguay 479wage path through 1997. Actual wages have been signiﬁcantly higher than the
simulated “nonunion” wage, based on average values for 1985–1997. Taking
into account the higher wage level and the reduced elasticities, employment
in 1985–1997 was lower than it would have been if unions had not returned.
Because of possible skepticism regarding the use of industry rather than
establishment data, we also examined the eﬀect of unionization on turn-
over, using household survey data. These results showed that workers in
unionized industries were much less likely to be laid oﬀ starting in 1985
than workers in nonunion industries. Before 1985, no such pattern is pres-
ent, indicating that unionization is not acting as a proxy for other industry
characteristics associated with high layoﬀ odds.
The following picture emerges from these results. Unions returned on
the scene as a political and economic force in 1985, and for two years more
than half of Uruguay’s workers were union members. Union density settled
down to about 40 percent in 1987–1992, and unions were able to success-
fully negotiate higher wages and were able to protect against job loss by re-
ducing employment elasticities. It would be useful to know the precise
mechanisms through which unions reduced employment adjustment. It is
doubtful that unions had much eﬀect on consumer choices, because no
steps were made to expand state ownership or deliberalize trade when
unions returned. The most likely channels through which unions had an
impact were restrictive work practices and the threat of strikes or slow-
downs in situations where layoﬀs were thought possible.
In the 1990s, the end of tripartite bargaining, trade liberalization, and
the recession in Argentina forced unions to make compromises at the bar-
gaining table. Faced with an adverse shift in labor demand, unions reduced
their wage demands to preserve jobs. Percentage union declined to 20 per-
cent, as many unionized establishments were no longer economically com-
petitive and others were forced to increase productivity to survive. When a
few more years of data become available, it would be fruitful to determine
if elasticities had returned to their 1975–1984 values.
This study has focused on wage and employment eﬀects of unions. To get
a more complete view of the overall impact of unions on the Uruguayan
economy, further study of strikes would be necessary to get a lower-bound
estimate of work hours lost to strikes. These would include not only strikes
against employers in the context of bargaining over wages, but also
strikes—including employer-speciﬁc, sector-speciﬁc, and general strikes—
that take place when a bargaining agreement is in eﬀect.
Finally, this study has not discussed the beneﬁts that result from suc-
cessful union-management cooperation. Future work should carefully ex-
amine this matter, not only because of a need to focus as carefully as pos-
sible on labor demand and bargaining, but also because the structure of
the system of labor relations has become increasingly decentralized in
Uruguay, and unions are apparently changing their utility function when
they bargain at the ﬁrm level under competitive pressures.
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Table 8A.1 Tests of Order of Integration per Manufacturing Industry, 1975–1997
Lag Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Employment: level (N)a
2– 1.1390 –0.76966 –0.76308 –0.90884 –1.2061 –1.1304
1– 1.3592 –0.37021 –0.62265 –0.44888 –1.1309 –1.0459
0– 1.4418 0.065646 –0.41783 –0.61987 –1.5025 –0.71382
Employment: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( N)b
2– 6.2857∗∗ –3.9358∗∗ –4.5668 –4.6456∗∗ –5.3364∗∗ –3.9579∗∗
1– 7.9173∗∗ –4.8130∗∗ –5.9609∗∗ –5.1050∗∗ –6.8421∗∗ –5.8053∗∗
0 –9.8103∗∗ –7.5615∗∗ –8.5221∗∗ –10.638∗∗ –11.078∗∗ –7.9268∗∗
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Production: level (Q)c
2– 1.3540 –2.5795 –1.9669 –2.5885 –2.1739 –2.5012
1 –2.1006 –2.6076 –2.1029 –2.7678 –2.0751 –2.2671
0– 3.3231 –2.5531 –2.4932 –3.4557 –2.5633 –2.2659
Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Production: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( Q)d
2– 12.875∗∗ –9.3050∗∗ –6.6666∗∗ –5.6461∗∗ –6.9455∗∗ –7.3525∗∗
1 –9.9075∗∗ –9.3008∗∗ –8.4027∗∗ –8.7462∗∗ –8.6921∗∗ –8.2238∗∗
0– 15.957∗∗ –11.736∗∗ –11.903∗∗ –11.808∗∗ –11.269∗∗ –11.540∗∗
Real Labor Costs: level (W)e
2– 1.6274 –1.4101 –1.1787 –0.66944 –1.6212 –0.80691
1– 1.0999 –1.4270 –1.5039 –0.77055 –1.6527 –1.4528
0– 1.5100 –2.1114 –1.5233 –1.1714 –1.9015 –2.0100
Real Labor Costs: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( W)f
2– 6.3493∗∗ –7.1240∗∗ –7.2240∗∗ –7.2307∗∗ –6.4613∗∗ –9.2235∗∗
1– 5.7181∗∗ –7.6787∗∗ –7.7919∗∗ –7.6088∗∗ –7.1191∗∗ –10.307∗∗
0– 11.331∗∗ –12.536∗∗ –9.5372∗∗ –11.935∗∗ –10.601∗∗ –12.048∗∗
Note: Industries reported are: food, beverage, and tobacco (31); textiles and apparel (32); pa-
per (34); chemicals (35); nonmetallic minerals (36); and metal products (38).
aUnit-root tests 1975 (4) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-
ues: 5%   –2.894; 1%   –3.505; Constant included.
bUnit-root tests 1976 (1) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-
ues: 5%   –2.894; 1%   –3.505; Constant included.
cUnit-root tests 1975 (4) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical values
Model 1: 5%  –3.46; 1%  –4.064; Constant and Trend and Seasonals included. Critical val-
ues Model 2: 5%   –2.894; 1%   –3.505; Constant included.
dUnit-root tests 1976 (1) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-
ues: 5%   –2.894; 1%   –3.505; Constant included.
eUnit-root tests 1975 (4) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-
ues: 5%   –2.894; 1%   –3.505; Constant included.
fUnit-root tests 1976 (1) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Fig. 8A.1 CI relation 1975–1997: Food, beverage, and tobacco
Fig. 8A.2 CI relation 1975–1997: Textiles and apparel
Fig. 8A.3 CI relation 1975–1997: Nonmetallic mineralsFig. 8A.4 CI relation 1975–1997: Metal products
Table 8A.3 Tests of Order of Integration per Manufacturing Industry, 1975–1984
Lag Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Employment: level (N)a
2 –2.5950 –1.6086 –1.2078 –1.2582 –0.83448 –1.2016
1 –2.7889 –1.3369 –1.1917 –1.1657 –0.85303 –1.0131
0 –2.7786 –0.87525 –1.2005 –1.1396 –1.2904 –0.40892
Employment: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( N)a
2– 3.5006∗ –2.3858 –3.1008∗ –2.7929 –3.3449∗ –2.2757
1– 4.7977∗∗ –2.7784 –4.0736∗∗ –3.3230∗ –4.7078∗∗ –2.9124
0– 5.9422∗∗ –3.9935∗∗ –5.9520∗∗ –5.3326∗∗ –7.8115∗∗ –3.8907∗∗
Production: level (Q)a
2– 1.3551 –1.5597 –1.0378 –1.5105 –1.2428 –1.3483
1– 1.5006 –1.7065 –1.0796 –1.9170 –1.1518 –1.1211
0– 3.5859∗ –1.8756 –1.3054 –2.1261 –1.3826 –1.4192
Production: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( Q)a
2– 7.0006∗∗ –4.5957∗∗ –3.1842∗∗ –3.6610∗∗ –4.1848∗∗ –3.8934∗∗
1– 5.8296∗∗ –4.8931∗∗ –4.4946∗∗ –5.3628∗∗ –4.1581∗∗ –3.9342∗∗
0– 11.328∗∗ –6.5990∗∗ –6.8692∗∗ –6.5669∗∗ –6.7829∗∗ –7.2999∗∗
Real Labor Costs: level (W)a
2– 1.9026 –1.5492 –1.2954 –1.2465 –1.6269 –1.2547
1– 1.4888 –1.0608 –1.6641 –1.2532 –1.3242 –1.5461
0– 1.7139 –1.7121 –1.5443 –1.7968 –1.4835 –1.8132
Real Labor Costs: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( W)a
2– 4.1317∗∗ 4.5866∗∗ –5.2300∗∗ –4.6311∗∗ –3.4348∗ –5.0862∗∗
1– 3.7696∗∗ –4.3153∗∗ –5.0854∗∗ –4.8072∗∗ –3.6439∗∗ –5.5376∗∗
0– 6.6798∗∗ –8.0047∗∗ –5.5840∗∗ –8.1063∗∗ –6.5290∗∗ –7.1038∗∗
Note: Industries reported are: food, beverage, and tobacco (31); textiles and apparel (32);
paper (34); chemicals (35); nonmetallic minerals (36); and metal products (38).
aUnit-root tests 1976 (1) to 1984 (4). Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical
values: 5%   –2.945; 1%   –3.623; Constant included.Table 8A.4 Tests of Order of Integration per Manufacturing Industry, 1985–1997
Lag Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Employment: level (N)a
2 0.46044 0.52536 0.52631 0.23815 –0.85312 –0.19819
1 0.071919 0.73045 0.47858 0.84976 –0.72559 –0.35062
0– 0.15768 0.56007 0.90892 0.26647 –0.68648 0.43073
Employment: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( N)b
2– 5.4181∗∗ –3.1749∗ –3.1094∗ –3.4679∗ –3.8123∗∗ –3.3249∗
1– 6.4158∗∗ –4.3344∗∗ –4.2772∗∗ –3.8352∗∗ –4.2025∗∗ –5.3928∗∗
0– 7.8121∗∗ –7.3548∗∗ –5.5190∗∗ –9.3899∗∗ –6.6537∗∗ –7.1566∗∗
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2
Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Production: level (Q)b
2– 0.75192 –1.2447 –2.9285 –1.9864 –4.2071∗∗ –2.1404
1– 1.5892 –1.5003 –2.6061 –1.9425 –3.9310∗ –2.1935
0 –2.6469 –1.6600 –3.3922 –2.6681 –4.1709∗∗ –2.3594
Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Production: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( Q)c
2– 13.804∗∗ –8.5948∗∗ –5.3499∗∗ –3.9875∗∗ –5.6954∗∗
1– 8.6737∗∗ –7.4293∗∗ –6.0758∗∗ –6.3471∗∗ –7.0047∗∗
0– 10.568∗∗ –9.2444∗∗ –8.7901∗∗ –8.9858∗∗ –8.4481∗∗
Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Real Labor Costs: level (W)a
2– 0.91189 –0.79368 –0.28570 –1.2903 –0.39377 –0.16091
1– 1.0367 –0.87610 –0.27960 –1.3079 –0.75799 –0.63152
0– 1.1111 –1.1709 –0.37651 –1.3448 –1.0533 –1.2518
Real Labor Costs: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( W)a
2– 4.8027∗∗ –5.8573∗∗ –3.5825∗∗ –4.7689∗∗ –6.4608∗∗ –9.4354∗∗
1– 4.5204∗∗ –6.6026∗∗ –5.0680∗∗ –5.3096∗∗ –6.8041∗∗ –9.1931∗∗
0– 11.318∗∗ –9.6385∗∗ –7.2193∗∗ –7.5302∗∗ –8.0805∗∗ –9.8846∗∗
Alternative Income: level (AW)a
2– 1.0622 –0.26599 –0.68071 –1.5105 –1.2264 –0.31812
1– 1.0977 –0.27479 –0.70182 –1.5243 –1.2636 –0.50304
0– 1.3744 –0.53359 –0.58792 –1.5418 –1.3169 –0.75351
Alternative Income: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( AW)a
2– 5.3632∗∗ –5.0075∗∗ –3.6446∗∗ –4.2448∗∗ –5.0124∗∗ –6.1520∗∗
1– 5.1457∗∗ –5.5917∗∗ –4.6648∗∗ –4.8143∗∗ –5.3230∗∗ –6.6413∗∗
0– 11.588∗∗ –8.8841∗∗ –6.2868∗∗ –6.7643∗∗ –7.3100∗∗ –8.3432∗∗Table 8A.4 (continued)
Lag Ind.31 Ind.32 Ind.34 Ind.35 Ind.36 Ind.38
Open: level (OPEN)a
2– 1.9511 –0.71192 –0.40513 –2.6096 –0.83810 0.037784
1– 1.8791 –0.75411 –0.42541 –2.6449 –0.90096 –0.074127
0– 1.8177 –0.79349 –0.44497 –2.6798 –0.95574 –0.16839
Open: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( OPEN)a
2– 3.8378∗∗ –4.0946∗∗ –3.9638∗∗ –4.0242∗∗ –4.6335∗∗ –4.5125∗∗
1– 4.7509∗∗ –4.9832∗∗ –4.8664∗∗ –4.9206∗∗ –5.4326∗∗ –5.3361∗∗
0– 6.7895∗∗ –7.0051∗∗ –6.8980∗∗ –6.9481∗∗ –7.3932∗∗ –7.3130∗∗
Union: level (UNION)a
2– 0.40374 –1.6373 –2.8522 –2.1880 –2.9658∗ –2.7446
1– 1.0067 –1.8707 –2.8877 –2.2243 –3.0142∗ –2.7748
0– 0.87189 –1.9477 –2.9067 –2.1657 –3.2859∗ –2.7978
Union: ﬁrst diﬀerences ( UNION)a
2– 4.6465∗∗ –4.3718∗∗ –4.2272∗∗ –3.3584∗ –3.6973∗∗ –3.3502∗
1– 6.4368∗∗ –6.2137∗∗ –4.7436∗∗ –5.0175∗∗ –3.9382∗∗ –4.7011∗∗
0– 6.3998∗∗ –7.2938∗∗ –6.5521∗∗ –6.8383∗∗ –5.2671∗∗ –7.1536∗∗
Note: See table 8A.3.
aUnit-root tests 1986 (1) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-
ues: 5%   –2.923; 1%   –3.571; Constant included.
bUnit-root tests 1986 (1) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical val-
ues Model 1: 5%   –2.923; 1%   –3.571; Constant included. Critical values Model 2: 5%  
–2.923; 1%   –3.571; Constant and Seasonals included. Critical values Model 3: 5%  
–3.504; 1%   –4.158; Constant and Trend and Seasonals included.
cUnit-root tests 1986 (1) to 1997 (4) Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (t-adf). Critical values
Model 1: 5%   –2.923; 1%   –3.571; Constant included.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.Industry 34: Paper
H0: 
Rank   p  -max 95% Trace 95%
1975–1984
p   0 23.1∗ 21.0 26.22 29.7
p   1 3.11 14.1 3.113 15.4




RES34 –1.3382 –1.4095 –1.3407
RES34 –1.7062 –1.6750 –1.7311
RES34 –1.5440 –1.4807 –1.6605
 -max 95% Trace 95%
1985–1997: bargaining variables added
p   0 73.1∗∗ 21.0 95.88 29.7
p   1 13.95 14.1 22.78∗∗ 15.4
p   2 .818 3.8 8.828 3.8
Industry 35: Chemicals
H0: 
Rank   p  -max 95% Trace 95%
1975–1984
p   0 21.45∗ 21.0 25.64 29.7
p   1 7.315 14.1 8.189 15.4




RES35 –1.9685 –3.1844 –3.1820
RES35 –1.8963 –3.2570 –3.2627
RES35 –2.2876 –3.4259 –3.2335
t-adf














RES31 –2.2252 –2.7936 –2.2839
RES31 –2.2789 –2.8361 –2.2479
RES31 –2.6317 –3.1671 –2.2749
t-adf













RES32 –3.1211∗ –3.2543 –3.0265
RES32 –2.8752 –3.1210 –2.7955
RES32 –2.9059 –3.1968 –2.8656
t-adf













RES36 –2.1903 –2.1938 –1.8111
RES36 –2.6522 –2.5122 –2.2906
RES36 –3.1145∗ –2.9676 –2.7709
t-adf













RES38 –1.7686 –1.4230 –1.6327
RES38 –2.7850 –2.6151 –2.3922
RES38 –3.0954∗ –2.9954 –2.6557
t-adf





Notes: RESj are the residuals of the static regression of employment on output and real labor costs for
industry j. In 1975–1984 and 1985–1997, the regression was done by OLS. When bargaining variables
are added, the residual refers to the same model but real labor costs include bargained costs and the
method of estimation is 3SLS, so that wages and output are endogenous. Variables explaining the wages
are real alternative income, union density and degree of openness. For industries 31 and 35, a dummy
variable with value 1 after 1992 is also included. Instruments for output are own lags and seasonals. For
industry 34, results using Johansen method are reported. M1 refers to a model with constant; M2 in-
cludes also a trend; and M3 further includes seasonal variables. Critical values at 5% are –2.921 for M1;
–3.502 for M2 and M3.
aUnit-root tests 1975 (4) to 1984 (4). Critical values: 5%   –2.942; 1%   –3.617; Constant included.
bUnit-root tests 1986 (1) to 1997 (4). Critical values: 5%   –2.923; 1%   –3.571; Constant included.
cUnit-root tests 1975 (4) to 1984 (4). Critical values: 5%   –3.535; 1%   –4.224; Constant and Trend in-
cluded.
dUnit-root tests 1986 (1) to 1997 (4). Critical values: 5%   –2.923; 1%   –3.568; Constant included.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.Table 8A.6 Nesting the Models: Manufacturing Industries, 1975–1997
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value t-prob
Equation 1 for LBLUES
DUMMY75 1.5171 0.16578 9.151 0.0000
DUMMY85 1.2348 0.18315 6.742 0.0000
DUMMY93 –0.042049 0.011321 –3.714 0.0002
Ind3175 –0.051645 0.023671 –2.182 0.0296
Ind3275 0.043068 0.018266 2.358 0.0188
Ind3475 0.029696 0.020280 1.464 0.1437
Ind3575 –0.11854 0.017924 –6.613 0.0000
Ind3675 –0.044275 0.017602 –2.515 0.0122
Ind3185 0.058061 0.024076 2.412 0.0162
Ind3285 0.070982 0.017312 4.100 0.0000
Ind3485 –0.042266 0.016816 –2.513 0.0123
Ind3585 –0.064253 0.020555 –3.126 0.0019
Ind3685 –0.051673 0.021734 –2.378 0.0178
Qr175 –0.014015 0.0092678 –1.512 0.1311
Qr275 0.0078926 0.0089734 0.880 0.3795
Qr375 –0.013270 0.0090311 –1.469 0.1423
Qr185 0.0028249 0.0085712 0.330 0.7418
Qr285 0.0093799 0.008029 1.168 0.2433
Qr385 –0.017306 0.007874 –2.198 0.0284
Q75 0.10918 0.017011 6.418 0.0000
Q85 0.061004 0.017210 3.535 0.0004
W5 –0.10453 0.015246 –6.856 0.0000
W85 –0.029461 0.017607 –1.673 0.0949
N75_1 0.87269 0.017045 51.198 0.0000
N85_1 0.87360 0.016696 52.323 0.0000
\sigma   0.0490045
Equation 2 for W5
DUMMY85 –0.25003 0.090993 –2.748 0.0062
DUMMY93 0.17669 0.029745 5.940 0.0000
Qr185 –0.0016989 0.0088961 –0.191 0.8486
Qr285 –0.0053882 0.0085706 –0.629 0.5298
Qr385 0.0015368 0.0084766 0.181 0.8562
AW85 1.1983 0.025099 47.742 0.0000
UNION 0.23724 0.014423 16.449 0.0000
UNION93 –0.37267 0.070938 –5.253 0.0000
UN3193 0.11571 0.074984 1.543 0.1234
UN3293 –0.25977 0.075826 –3.426 0.0007
UN3493 –0.033919 0.067072 –0.506 0.6133
UN3593 0.33136 0.058549 5.659 0.0000
UN3693 –1.6041 0.25859 –6.203 0.0000Table 8A.6 (continued)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error t-value t-prob
OPEN85 –0.044855 0.0089277 –5.024 0.0000
W85_1 0.0088766 0.0053193 1.669 0.0958
\sigma   0.0528143
loglik   3,274.5936 log\Omega   –11.9948
\Omega   6.17595e-006 T   546
LR test of over-identifying restrictions:  2(28)   249.677 [0.0000]∗∗
Notes: N is number of production workers; W is the real labor cost of a production worker; Q
is production; AW is the alternative wage; UNION is union density; OPEN is the degree of
openness; Qrj is a dummy variable for quarter j; Ind.i is a dummy variable for industry 
i. Industries included are: food, beverage, and tobacco (31); textiles and apparel (32); paper
(34); chemicals (35); nonmetallic minerals (36); and metal products (38). “_1” attached to a
variable indicates the variable is lagged one period. Variables with “75” have the actual val-
ues from 1975 up to 1984 and zero elsewhere. Those ending in “85” have a value of zero in
1975–1984 and the actual value from that date on. DUMMY75 is a dummy variable equal to
1 in 1975–1984; DUMMY85 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in 1985–1997; DUMMY93 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 in 1993–1997. UNION93 is UNION multiplied by DUMMY93;
UNj 93 is UNION93 multiplied by Ind.j. The method of estimation is 3SLS. The present
sample is 7 to 552.
Tests of hypothesis: (1) Q75   Q85: &19-&20   0; Wald test for general restrictions: Gen-
Res  2(1)   4.6104 [0.0318]∗.
(2) W75   W85: &21-&22   0; Wald test for general restrictions: GenRes  2(1)   10.469
[0.0012]∗∗.
(3) LAGGED N75  LAGGED N85:&23-&24  0; Wald test for general restrictions: Gen-
Res  2(1)   0.15229 [0.6964].
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